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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on the impact of different government
policies on entrepreneurial financing. In the first chapter, by quantitatively
evaluating the impact of different personal bankruptcy regimes on entrepreneur-
ship in a life-cycle model with occupational choices, I conclude that personal
bankruptcy law affect entrepreneurship mainly through the insurance effect
rather than the borrowing cost effect. In addition, I find that variations in
bankruptcy regimes have very different impacts on households with different
abilities, and changes in the length of post-bankruptcy punishments have the
largest impact on entrepreneurship compared to variations in other dimen-
sions of the bankruptcy regime. In the second chapter, I demonstrate in a
model that firms could be credit-constrained due to aggregate uncertainty and
the government could offer insurance in the form of loan guarantees to ease
borrowing constraints for small businesses, thus increase the efficiency of the
overall economy. The third chapter shows that different regulation on equity
financing by financial institution could be an explanation for the large dispar-
ity in sectoral allocation of investments by Venture Capital industries between
developed countries. I develop a simple principal-agent model shows that when
three commonly documented characteristics of the high-tech industry coexist,
the ability for lenders to vary the level of control contingent on performance be-
comes key. Thus venture capitalists as equity holders have a clear advantage
in financing young high-tech firms in countries where equity financing from
banks is not allowed.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
My dissertation consists of three separate papers on entrepreneurial financ-
ing. A unifying theme in this work is the impact of government policies on
entrepreneurship. Different types of government policies could have large im-
pact on the financing of entrepreneurial firms, and thus have the potential to
greatly shape a country/region’s entrepreneurial sector.
The first chapter examines the impact of personal bankruptcy laws on en-
trepreneurship. Limited personal liability has long been thought to promote
entrepreneurship by providing partial insurance through debt relief in the
event of business failure. However, providing this insurance through debt re-
lief makes borrowing more costly and tightens borrowing constraints. To exam-
ine the quantitative effects of these two opposing forces on entrepreneurship,
I study a life cycle model where households choose between running a risky
2business and working. Households in the model differ in entrepreneurial abil-
ities and face both labor income and business productivity risks. I calibrate
the model to the U.S. economy, and then consider the effect of alternative per-
sonal bankruptcy regimes. For reasonable parameter values, a less lenient
(higher post bankruptcy garnishment of income) bankruptcy law deters house-
holds with moderate entrepreneurial ability from entering entrepreneurship,
while variations in bankruptcy systems have negligible effects on higher abil-
ity households’ occupational choice decisions. The effect of personal bankruptcy
law on the level of entrepreneurship is driven primarily by the insurance ef-
fect rather than the borrowing cost effect. Consequently, entrepreneurs prefer
more lenient bankruptcy regimes that provide higher insurance values.
The second chapter assesses whether insurance against aggregate risk (such
as the current economic downturn) could be an important rationale for popular
government operated loan-guarantee programs for small and medium enter-
prises (SME). I demonstrate in a model that firms could be credit-constrained
due to aggregate uncertainty, because financial institutions face high borrow-
ing cost during economic downturns. Since it has relatively lower borrowing
costs during recession, the government could offer insurance in the form of
loan guarantees to ease borrowing constraints for small businesses. I prove
that under certain conditions, a program with net present value of zero could
be socially beneficial. Furthermore, I show that a guarantee program with a
fixed fee is associated with adverse-selection, and leads to the “over-lending”
3problem. Thus, the high cost of obtaining guarantees and thorough qualifica-
tion requirements can be viewed as tools to mitigate this problem.
The third chapter shows that different regulation on equity financing of-
fered by financial institution could be an explanation for the large disparity
in sectoral allocation of Venture Capital (VC) investments between developed
countries. During the 1990s, various European governments introduced poli-
cies that encourage VC investments with the hope of replicating the U.S. VC
industry’s success in financing high-tech firms. Recent data suggests that VC
investments concentrate in high-tech sectors only in those countries where
banks are not allowed to offer equity financing. To help explain this fact, I
develop a simple principal-agent model of start-up financing with both private
information and hidden actions, where the equity investor can vary the level of
control over the firm and the debt investor cannot. The model shows that when
three commonly documented characteristics of the high-tech industry coexist,
namely: (i) a high degree of information asymmetry, (ii) a high level of un-
certainty about returns, and (iii) a large amount of R&D investment preceding
production, then the ability for lenders to vary the level of control contingent on
performance becomes key. Unlike debt, equity ownership provides control over
a firm during normal operations. Thus venture capitalists as equity holders
have a clear advantage in financing young high-tech firms in countries where
equity financing from banks is not allowed; in countries with no such restric-
tion, they no longer have this advantage. This result helps explain why most
4European governments’ efforts in promoting VC activities failed to attract such
investments in high-tech industries.
5Chapter 2
The Impact of Personal
Bankruptcy Law on
Entrepreneurship
2.1 Introduction
Personal bankruptcy is often used as an exit strategy for failing small busi-
nesses that are solely owned, since business debts of sole proprietorships are
legally personal liabilities.1 In addition, owners of small corporations are fre-
quently asked to provide personal guarantees when applying for business loans.2
Hence, most small business owners file for personal bankruptcy when they are
in financial distress. In fact, Lawless and Warren (2005) reported that up to
20% of personal bankruptcy filings are attributable to small business failures
1In the U.S., more than 78% of businesses are sole proprietorships; the number is even
higher in Europe, at around 82%.
2Berger and Udell (1998) examine the data from the Survey of Small Business Financing,
find that up to 52% of all small business loans from financial institutions have personal guaran-
tees against them, and 93% have either personal guarantees or personal assets against them.
6in the U.S.
There is considerable differences in personal bankruptcy regimes across de-
veloped countries that offer such option to individuals. In the U.S., a Chap-
ter 7 filing provides debtors with a “fresh start” by discharging all unsecured
debts in exchange for all (non-exempted) assets. A crucial feature of Chapter
7 is that all future income of the filer is protected. In contrast, most other
developed countries require filers to repay debts from both assets and post-
bankruptcy income. For instance, the length of post-bankruptcy income gar-
nishment currently ranges from no year in U.S. to 6 years in Germany to 8-10
years in France. Since Personal bankruptcy is important for entrepreneurs,
one would expect there is a link between these cross-country differences in per-
sonal bankruptcy regimes and differences in entrepreneurship.
This chapter examines the quantitative effects of different personal bankruptcy
regimes on entrepreneurship, output, and welfare. Many have argued that an
entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law has helped to create a more vibrant en-
trepreneurial sector in the U.S. Recently, heated debates among policy-makers
in Europe led to reforms of personal bankruptcy regimes in the region (White,
2007; Armour and Cumming, 2008): Germany introduced its first personal
bankruptcy law in 1999 and subsequently reduced the length of post-bankruptcy
garnishment periods; and there is also an initiative to reduce the harshness of
personal bankruptcy at the EU level.3 However, the impact of different aspects
3Clearly going toward the other direction, U.S. introduced the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act in 2005, which made it more difficult for individuals to obtain
7of personal bankruptcy regime on entrepreneurship deserves a more careful
investigation.
How does personal bankruptcy law affect entrepreneurship? On the one
hand, personal bankruptcy provides small business debtors partial insurance
by offering an option to discharge debt in case of business failures. This makes
borrowing to start a risky business more attractive since it reduces the cost
of failure by limiting the borrower’s liability. It increases business owners’
abilities to smooth across states in an incomplete market by giving some con-
tingency to the debt contract. However, this insurance comes at a price, since
financial intermediaries charge a higher premium on loans to cover default
risks, which makes borrowing more costly and tightens the borrowing con-
straint. Thus, as personal bankruptcy weakens entrepreneurs’ ability to com-
mit to future debt repayment, it decreases their ability to invest at the efficient
scale. This trade-off suggests that any evaluation of bankruptcy regimes needs
to consider the effect on borrowing costs and constraints versus the value of
insurance against “bad lucks”4.
This trade-off is especially relevant for entrepreneurship because there is a
large literature on financial constraints for entrepreneurs (Evans and Leighton,
1989; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). On the borrowing cost side, Berkowitz and
White (2004) find that it is harder to get financing for entrepreneurs in U.S.
a discharge from indebtedness, although it is intended to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy
system (White, 2007). Small business debtors, however, were specifically excluded from these
changes (Armour and Cumming, 2008).
4Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) examine a similar trade-off for consumers .
8states with generous asset exemptions.5 On the insurance side, there is ev-
idence to suggest that the “insurance effect” of personal bankruptcy actually
dominates in determining the level of entrepreneurship. Fan and White (2003)
find that the probability of households owning businesses is 35% higher in
states with unlimited as opposed to low exemptions. Many empirical studies on
cross-country differences in bankruptcy laws have also found that people are
less likely to become entrepreneurs in countries with less “forgiving” regimes
(Lee, Yamakawa, and Peng, 2007; Armour and Cumming, 2008).
To quantify the impact of personal bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship,
I construct an incomplete market life-cycle model with occupational choice.
Households differ in entrepreneurial abilities, they make repeated occupational
choices between working and running a risky business, and they (workers and
entrepreneurs) also make bankruptcy decisions, taking a bankruptcy system
as given. Workers face uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk, and en-
trepreneurs face uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity risk, where the pro-
duction risk is higher compared to the labour income risk. But they face the
same bankruptcy law. Firms operated by different ability entrepreneurs are
assumed to have different probability distributions over a finite number of pro-
ductivity realizations, such that those businesses run by high-ability house-
holds are more likely to get higher productivity draws compared to those run
by low-ability households.
5In the U.S., all states have their own specific asset exemptions for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
For instance, homestead exemptions range from $5,000 in Georgia to unlimited in Florida (as
long as the property does not exceed half an acre in a municipality or 160 acres elsewhere).
9A bankruptcy regime is exogenously given and specifies the following: 1) the
length of post-bankruptcy income garnishment; 2) the income exemption level;
3) the fraction of income garnisheed above exemption level; and 4) the asset
exemption level, which captures the main ways that personal bankruptcy laws
differ across countries. Households can save or borrow via one period non-
contingent bonds in a perfect competitive financial market. Intermediaries
can observe a household’s current labor income shock, entrepreneurial ability
level, current level of borrowing, level of business capital, and age. Hence,
intermediaries charge a default premium according to the individual-specific
risk of each loan. As an equilibrium result, the price of loans is a function of
all these observables.
In this model, an increase in the severity of bankruptcy punishment (i.e.,
lowering exemption levels or increasing the fraction or length of post bankruptcy-
income garnishment) decreases the endogenous household default probability
and raises the expected repayments from bankruptcy filers, thereby relaxing
the borrowing constraints. As a result, households are also less willing to take
risks, as the insurance value provided by the bankruptcy system decreases.
I first calibrate the model to match several key moments of the U.S. econ-
omy, and then consider the steady-state effects of alternative personal bankruptcy
regimes on the calibrated U.S. economy. Specifically, I start with the calibrated
model and perform the following four sets of counterfactual experiments: in
the first two, I separately vary the length and the fraction of post-bankruptcy
10
income garnishment; in the third experiment, I vary the level of asset exemp-
tion level; lastly, I set bankruptcy regimes in four counterfactuals to replicate
the regimes of Canada, the UK, Germany, and France.
The key insight from these counterfactual exercises is that variations in
bankruptcy regimes have very different impacts on households with different
entrepreneurial abilities. First, variations in bankruptcy regimes have negligi-
ble effects on the occupational choices of households with high entrepreneurial
ability, because businesses run by these entrepreneurs are less risky (i.e., se-
vere failures are less likely to occur for them). Second, harsh bankruptcy pun-
ishments mainly deter households with moderate entrepreneurial ability from
entering entrepreneurship, since failure is more likely to happen, so varia-
tions in bankruptcy policy have a much bigger impact on their occupational
decisions. In other words, this quantitative exercise suggests that the insur-
ance effect of personal bankruptcy law on entrepreneurs completely dominates
the borrowing cost effect, mainly through affecting the occupational decisions
of households with moderate ability levels. As a result, the extensive mar-
gin effect of a more lenient personal bankruptcy regime is to encourage more
households to undertake risky entrepreneurship,6 although, these additional
businesses are less productive because the households on the margin are those
with moderate entrepreneurial abilities. On the “intensive margin,” a more le-
nient personal bankruptcy regime lowers the average firm size, because, first,
6This finding agrees with the empirical results of Armour and Cumming (2008) and White
(2007).
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the firms on the margin are run by moderate ability households, their lower
expected productivity means they want to operate at a smaller scale; second,
more lenient regime increases borrowing cost, which limits entrepreneurs’ abil-
ity to invest at the efficient scale.
Although the model suggests that a more lenient bankruptcy regime leads
to a drop in average firm size and average productivity in the entrepreneurial
sector, the total output of the economy actually rises. This is because risk-
averse households choose to pursue entrepreneurship only if the expected busi-
ness return is much higher than the sum of expected wage income and the risk-
free return of the investment, such that the difference between the two is large
enough to compensate for the risk that the household is undertaking. Conse-
quently, entrepreneurial households prefer more lenient regimes because they
bear more risks compared to worker households, so the insurance value pro-
vided by personal bankruptcy is more important to them. On the other hand,
worker households prefer less lenient regimes because labour income risk is
more moderate compared to business risk, such that they care more about the
ability to smooth consumption across time through borrowing.
Among different dimensions of personal bankruptcy law, variations in the
length (periods) of post-bankruptcy punishment appear to have the largest im-
pact on entrepreneurship; changes in fraction of garnishment also have large
impact. Increase in length and fraction of post-bankruptcy garnishment mono-
tonically lowers the level of entrepreneurship and discourages moderate-ability
12
households from entering entrepreneurship. On the other hand, changes in the
asset exemption level only have a modest effect. In particular, increasing the
asset exemption level encourages entrepreneurship first and then discourages
it once past a certain level. This inverted U-relationship between the two is
consistent with the findings of Akyol and Athreya (2011) and Meh and Tera-
jima (2008).
Given that the bankruptcy code mainly affects the occupational decisions of
households with moderate ability levels, the model replicates three key facts on
cross-country differences in entrepreneurship: less lenient bankruptcy regimes
are associated with 1) lower levels of entrepreneurship,7 2) higher proportions
of bigger and maturer firms in the economy, and 3) lower business turnover
rates. The ability of the model to account for these facts is driven by the re-
sult that tougher bankruptcy law reduces the fraction of moderate-ability en-
trepreneurs in the economy, while higher ability entrepreneurs (whose occupa-
tional decisions are rarely affected by change in bankruptcy regimes) operate
bigger firms and they survive longer. Thus, an increase in the level of en-
trepreneurship lowers the average productivity in the entrepreneurial sector,
because the firms on the margin are operated by moderate-ability households.
Note that these results depend on the crucial assumption that the households’
entrepreneurial ability determines the likelihood of suffering severer failures.
One support for this view is the observation that older firms are less likely to
7This result is consistent with the empirical findings of Armour and Cumming (2008), who
estimated that a ten year reduction of garnishment time increases the self-employment rate
by 1.5%.
13
fail compared to younger firms.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related empirical
and theoretical literature. Section 3 documents different personal bankruptcy
regimes and some empirical facts of entrepreneurship across some developed
countries. Section 4 describes the model. The benchmark parameterizations
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 shows the counterfactual results. Section
7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
In addition to the study of Armour and Cumming (2008), which shows that
more lenient bankruptcy regimes are associated with an increase in the self-
employment rate in their sample of fifteen countries over sixteen years, this
chapter is also related to other empirical literatures on the impact of bankruptcy
policies on entrepreneurship. White (2007) shows that the probability of be-
coming self-employed is higher in states with higher homestead exemptions in
the U.S. Berkowitz and White (2004) find that it is harder for small business
owners to get external financing in U.S. states with high asset exemptions. Paik
(2010) in a recent paper finds that the probability of becoming self-employed
within unincorporated firms declined after the bankruptcy reform act of 2005,
which made qualifying for Chapter 7 bankruptcy harder. However, these works
are likely to suffer from country- or state-specific effects, such as tax rates or
14
banking regulations. In another paper, Georgellis, Howard, university Con-
sortium for Political, and Research (2006) investigate the impact of marginal
income tax rates and bankruptcy exemptions on entrepreneurship, finding an
S-shaped relationship between bankruptcy exemptions and entrepreneurship.
This means that the relationship between asset exemption and levels of en-
trepreneurship is not monotone.
This chapter is closely related to Akyol and Athreya (2011), Meh and Tera-
jima (2008), and Herranz, Krasa, and Villamil (2009), who also study macroeco-
nomic models of occupational choice with the presence of a bankruptcy system.
Akyol and Athreya (2011) study the effect of different asset exemption levels
on entrepreneurship, and find that a personal bankruptcy system encourages
entrepreneurship, and alters the timing, size, and financing of projects. In
their model, high-ability households are assumed to have higher average pro-
ductivity as entrepreneurs and workers, rather than affecting the distribution
of productivity shocks. Meh and Terajima (2008) find that eliminating asset ex-
emption increases the level of entrepreneurship and welfare; but on the other
hand, eliminating the bankruptcy system leads to a large fall in the level of
entrepreneurship and welfare. Herranz, Krasa, and Villamil (2009) analyze
the impact of owners’ personal characteristics such as risk tolerance or opti-
mism and the bankruptcy system on firm performances, finding that reducing
bankruptcy exclusion periods can lead to large welfare gains. They find that
the welfare effects for firm owners are much greater than in those consumer
15
studies and that the insurance effect of corporate bankruptcy is more impor-
tant than the interest rate effect, which agrees with the finding of this chapter.
This chapter differs in three key ways from these earlier papers: first,
households have different entrepreneurial abilities in my model. For instance,
higher-ability households’ are less likely to face severe failures compared to
moderate-ability households and are more likely to experience higher produc-
tivity shocks.8 This is a natural assumption because certain individuals are
better fitted to run businesses, as in the Lucas (1978) span-of-control type
of frame work. These additions allow me to derive the implied productiv-
ity differences in the entrepreneurial sectors under each bankruptcy regime,
which arises from variations in the quantity (extensive margin) and quality
(intensive margin) of entrepreneurs. Second, this model features variation in
length of post-bankruptcy garnishments. This is important because personal
bankruptcy laws in developed countries differ from each other mainly along
this dimension. In fact, I show that variations in the length of post-bankruptcy
punishments have the largest impact on entrepreneurship compared to vari-
ations in other dimensions of the bankruptcy regime. Third, liquidation costs
are incorporated in this chapter. As discussed in many studies, the value of
8As opposed to Akyol and Athreya (2011), who assume that only the average productivity
depends on ability, I assume that the support for productivity draw is the same regardless
of ability, but the distribution over the set is different. I.e, if two identical firms are run by
entrepreneurs with different ability, the possible outcomes of the businesses are the same, but
the higher ability entrepreneurs is more likely to get good outcomes. It is difficult to imagine
that two identical firms run by different ability entrepreneurs could both fail badly (or have
tremendous success) but generate large difference in their losses (returns).
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capital lost in the liquidation process can be substantial: the average liquida-
tion costs cited range from 36.5% to 45% (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). This has
a large influence on the occupational decisions of entrepreneurs who are not
doing well, because it substantially increases the cost of quitting business.
There are also other theoretical studies of default and entrepreneurship:
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) study a model of similar occupation choices and
find that tighter borrowing constraints generate less wealth concentration and
reduce average firm size, aggregate capital, and the fraction of entrepreneurs.
In their model, however, limited commitment only limits borrowing, as produc-
tion is risk-less, so default does not occur in their equilibrium, such that there is
no trade-off between insurance effect and borrowing cost effect. Landier (2005)
studies a multiple-equilibrium model based on endogenous stigma of failure,
in which the cost of failure depends on the particular equilibrium outcome. In
his model, there is only the continuation decision and no occupational choice,
and the cost of quitting business does not depend on any particular bankruptcy
regime.
A number of recent papers have studied the economic effects of personal
bankruptcy law on consumers in dynamic equilibrium models. Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt (2007) study a model with income garnishment that allows inter-
est to vary with household characteristics such as age, loan size, and income
shock. They showed that the U.S. Chapter 7 system leads to welfare gain com-
pared a system that has no personal bankruptcy, as was the case in Germany
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prior to 1999. They also show that expense shocks and life-cycle effects are im-
portant factors to consider when comparing bankruptcy regimes. Chatterjee,
Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007) examine a similar model without life
cycle and expense shocks; their results show that mean-testing under Chapter
7 leads to large welfare gains. Athreya (2008) incorporates social insurance
policy in a similar setting, and finds that the U.S. bankruptcy system creates
severe credit constraints, eliminating bankruptcy lowers (raises) consumption
inequality among the young (old). He also argues that the social insurance pol-
icy is an important factor to consider when evaluating the effect of bankruptcy
policy on consumption smoothing. In an earlier paper, Athreya (2002) builds on
Aiyagari (1994), assuming one interest rate for all and finding that eliminat-
ing the bankruptcy system improves welfare. Li and Sarte (2006), in a similar
setting to Athreya (2002), incorporate aggregate production and a partial asset
exemption as well as the choice between Chapter 7 and 13 in the model and
find that eliminating the bankruptcy system reduces welfare. Clearly, though,
these models do not account for risk-taking entrepreneurial activities.
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2.3 Entrepreneurships and Personal Bankruptcy
Law Across Countries
This section first presents the differences in personal bankruptcy law for five
developed countries: the U.S., Canada, the UK, Germany, and France.9 Key
statistics of entrepreneurship for the five countries are presented next.
Personal bankruptcy regimes vary in five key dimensions across countries:
1) the length of the repayment obligation (periods of post-bankruptcy garnishee-
ing); 2) the income exemption; 3) the fraction of income above exemption level
that is garnisheed; 4) the asset exemption; and 5) other punishments. A bankruptcy
policy is more “forgiving” or lenient if exemption levels are higher and the frac-
tion that is garnisheed, length of repayment period, and other punishments
are lower.
Table 2.1 summarizes the details of personal bankruptcy regimes in five
countries at year 200410: France, Germany, the UK, Canada, and the United
States. The first four countries require borrowers to repay from both assets
9This group of five developed countries are selected because entrepreneurship data from
GEM and data on bankruptcy regimes (taken from White (2007)) are readily available. There
is a group of other similar European developed countries just simply do not offer discharge
option to individuals, for instance Spain, Switzerland and Italy. Japan did not offer such option
until 2005.
10Most statistics about entrepreneurship in this chapter are taken from around 2003-2004;
the personal bankruptcy laws around this period are the most relevant ones. Germany only
introduced its personal bankruptcy law in 1999. A couple of countries changed their laws after
2004: the U.S. introduced the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, and UK reduced the repayment period from three to one year later. For more detail, see
White 2007.
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and subsequent income after bankruptcy.11 French bankruptcy law is the least
“forgiving” (or the most pro-creditor ): exemptions are low, most income above
exemption level is garnisheed, and the repayment period can last up to ten
years. U.S. Chapter 7, on the other hand, is the most “forgiving” (or most pro-
debtor) : the asset exemption level is very high, and there is no garnisheeing of
post-bankruptcy income. It should be clear that the countries in Table 2.1 are
organized in order: from left to right is the least to the most lenient system.
Table 2.2 gives seven key entrepreneurship statistics for these five coun-
tries: 1) proportion of the adult population that owns and manages a busi-
ness;12 2) proportion of young firms;13 3) fraction of survey respondents reply as
being self-employed (European Union 2004);14 4) fraction of businesses younger
than 3 years; 5) proportion of firms with zero employees; 6) fraction of employer
firms with fewer than 20 employees; and 7) annual entry/exit rate. The first
two statistics are taken from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2003 global
report, while the third and fourth are taken from Flash Eurobarometer Survey
160, which was conducted in 2004 for the European Union.15 Statistics on the
11Although the Canadian bankruptcy law includes rules for post bankruptcy garnishment,
most filers actually do not have pay from their future income. This will be addressed in the
counterfactual experiment.
12The definition of entrepreneur here follows that of the GEM’s, i.e an individual between
the age of 18-64 who are currently owner-manager of an established business.
13In the survey, a new business owner is defined as an owner-manager of a firm that has paid
wages or salaries for more than 3, but less than 42 months
14The definition in this survey is different from that of the GEM’s, i.e being self-employed vs.
owner-manger of a business.
15These survey data are used because that government-published statistics differ quite a bit
in definitions of entrepreneurs (even in the definition of self-employment, for that matter) and
methodology used for measurement across countries. These survey data, on the other hand,
are collected in a consistent fashion across countries: all the questionnaires and conducting
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proportion of employer firms with fewer than twenty employees and entry/exit
rates are from Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2007).
There are three observations about these statistics: first, there exists a posi-
tive relationship between the leniency offered by a country’s bankruptcy regime
and its level of entrepreneurship. In the GEM 2003 data, France, whose has
the toughest bankruptcy law, has the smallest proportion of adult population
identified as entrepreneurs, 4.22%, versus 7% for Germany, 8.8% for the UK,
9.7% for Canada, and 10.6%16 for the U.S. The same pattern is observed in
the Flash Eurobarometer Survey 160 data.17 Second, there seems to exist a
negative relationship between how pro-creditor a bankruptcy regime is and
the share of maturer firms in the economy; thus, the business turnover rate
is higher for those countries with more “forgiving” regimes. This trend is ob-
served consistently across different measures and data sources as well. Third,
there is also weak evidence that suggests that countries with less “forgiving”
regimes also have lower shares of smaller firms. To summarize, countries with
less lenient (more pro-creditor) personal bankruptcy regimes have fewer en-
trepreneurs, and they also have higher shares of larger firms, higher shares of
older firms, and lower business turnover rates.
methodology are the same for all participating countries.
16There are several data sources that report U.S. has a low self-employment rate when com-
pared to others, this is due to the definition of self-employment across countries. For instance,
in the U.S. official data, a self-employed individual for a corporation is not counted towards
self-employment, but is counted in the Canadian data. Which gives reason to use the survey
data from GEM here.
17The large deviation in scale between these two different measures is because that the
GEM’s number is owner-manager out of the adult population, while Eurobarometer measures
self-employment out of survey replies.
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These observations suggest that the “quality” of active entrepreneurs is
higher in countries with tougher bankruptcy laws. In general, better firms
would grow bigger and survive longer, which is the reason behind the selec-
tion effect of tough bankruptcy law on entrepreneurs: moderate-ability en-
trepreneurs do not start businesses and high-ability ones get to grow their
businesses bigger and longer partially because of the lowered borrowing costs.
2.4 Model
I extend the model of Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) to include occupa-
tional choice and small business ventures. This is a life-cycle model. Each
generation lives for J periods (including retirement periods), is comprised of
a continuum of ex-ante identical households of measure 1. Households max-
imize discounted life-time utility from consumption, face idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty about labour income and business return. There is no aggregate un-
certainty, and the risk-free interest rate is exogenously given. Markets are
incomplete: the only assets in this economy are household-specific one-period,
non-contingent bonds. There is no market for insurance.
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2.4.1 Household
Each household maximizes its expected lifetime utility,
E0
J∑
j=1
βj−1nju
( cj
nj
)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount factor, cj is the consumption at
age j. u(·) is the with-in period utility function, where u(·)′ > 0, u′′(·) < 0. nj
is the equivalence scale unit of family size at age j. The introduction of family
size is important to explain the hump-shaped consumption profile over the life
cycle.18
For each period, households can choose either to work for labour income in
the corporate sector or enter risky entrepreneurship for the next period, e′ ∈
{0, 1} (e stands for entrepreneur); unlike Meh and Terajima (2008), households
cannot work and run a business at the same time. Following Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt (2007), the labor income of household i at age j depends upon its
labour productivity and endowment:
yij = 
i
j y¯j
ij = z
i
jη
i
j
where ij is the household’s stochastic labour productivity at age j and y¯j is the
deterministic average life-cycle profile of earnings. The household’s productiv-
ity is the product of persistent shock zij and a transitory shock ηij.
18For detail, see Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Davies (1988), and Fernandez-Villaverde
and Krueger (2004).
23
At the beginning of life (period 1), every household draws a permanent en-
trepreneurial ability level ρ ∈ {ρ, ...ρ¯} (which does not change over time). This
ability level ρ determines the household’s distribution of idiosyncratic business
productivity shock θ ∈ {θ, ...θ¯}, so that while the realization of θ′ is unknown,
ρ is known by everyone before occupational choices are made. The distribution
function of θ conditional on having the ability level ρ is denoted by Φρ(θ). I
will assume that once conditioned on a particular ability level, θ is indepen-
dent and identically distributed over time, independent of income shocks and
having only finite support. The gross period return from a business is given by:
F (θ, k) = f(θ, k) + (1− δ)k = θkα + (1− δ)k
where k ∈ [0,∞) is the capital (asset) of the firm, 0 < α < 1 is the return-
to-scale parameter, and δ is the deprecation parameter. Note that the actual
return does not directly depend on ρ, although the distribution of θ does. In this
model, households that decide to run a risky business are called entrepreneurs,
while the remainder of the population is referred as workers.
2.4.2 Bankruptcy Regime
A household, either a worker or an entrepreneur, with debt level d > 0 has
the option to declare bankruptcy; the household bankruptcy state is denoted
b ∈ {0, 1}, with b = 1 indicating filed for bankruptcy. To capture the features
of bankruptcy provisions across a number of different countries, this chapter
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incorporates the following. First and most importantly, post-bankruptcy in-
come garnishment is incorporated. Secondly, period income and business as-
sets used for repayment are treated differently. In contrast to labour income or
income from a business that is almost costless to garnishee, the reported liq-
uidation costs of business capital range from 36.5% to 45%.19 In particular, the
bankruptcy system in this model specifies five different type of costs frequently
mentioned in the literature:
1. income garnishment: income of current and G periods after bankruptcy is
garnisheed at rate γ and transferred to creditors subject to an exemption
level w¯;
2. liquidation of assets: business assets above the exemption level x¯ are
seized by creditors for liquidation, where the liquidation cost is ζ;
3. transaction cost: filers lose fraction λ of their consumption during the
bankruptcy and garnisheeing period;
4. exclusion from entrepreneurship: filers cannot run a business during gar-
nisheeing periods. 20
5. exclusion from credit market: filers cannot borrow during the bankruptcy
19Liquidation costs are calculated as fraction of book value that is lost during the liquidation
process
20Only Canada and the UK specifically state that bankrupts are not allowed to run a busi-
ness during these periods; given the limited access to financial markets and heavy garnishee-
ing of income of other regimes, one’s ability to start a business is effectively limited.
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and garnisheeing periods.21
A household’s garnishment status is denoted g ∈ {0, 1...G}, which is the number
of garnishment periods left (i.e., a household not under garnishment has g = 0,
while a household that just declared bankruptcy has g = G).
To illustrate how one’s income and assets are treated after filing bankruptcy,
it is convenient to define the amount of resources left after the bankruptcy
decision-making as A. Specifically, if a household does not file for bankruptcy
and is not under garnishment, A is simply:
A(d, k, θ, , e, g = 0, b = 0) = e× F (θ, k) + (1− e)× y¯j − d (2.1)
where F (θ, k) is the gross return from running a business. Note that e = 0 and
k = 0 for a worker household.
The resources an entrepreneur with business capital size k, productivity
shock θ, has left after declaring personal bankruptcy is given by:
A(d, k, θ, , e = 1, g = 0, b = 1) =
max{f(θ, k)− γmax{f(θ, k)− w¯, 0}, 0}+ (1− ζ) min{(1− δ)k, x¯} (2.2)
Where f(θ, k) is the value of production, γmax{f(θ, k) − w¯, 0} is the amount
that is garnisheed for repaying creditors, and the third is the post-liquidation
value of business capital that is exempted. Similarly, for a worker with labour
productivity  and age j, the resources at hand after declaring bankruptcy are,
A(d, k, θ, , e = 0, g = 0, b = 1) = y¯j − γmax{y¯j − w¯, 0} (2.3)
21I do not exclude households from saving, as it is not specified in bankruptcy laws. Further-
more, unlike loans, a financial institution is unlikely to reject deposits(or investments) based
on one’s credit history.
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The resources at hand of a worker under post-bankruptcy income garnishment
are (when g > 0)22:
A(d, k, θ, , e = 0, g > 0, b = 0) = y¯j − γmax{y¯j − w¯, 0} − d (2.4)
2.4.3 Financial Intermediation
The set-up in the financial market follows closely the bankruptcy literature23
in which the risk-free saving interest rate rf is exogenously given.24 Loans take
the form of one-period bond contracts. The face value of these bonds is denoted
by d, which is the amount to be received (repaid in the case of borrowing) the
next period. The convention is that d > 0 denotes borrowing, and d < 0 denotes
saving. The market for bonds is perfectly competitive.
While these loans are non-contingent because the face value does not de-
pend on the realization of any value, the option to declare bankruptcy intro-
duces a partial contingency. To capture the household-specific risk of bankruptcy,
intermediaries charge household-specific bonds prices. When making loans, in-
termediaries are assumed to be able to observe the total level of borrowing, the
size of the business, ability level, current earning shock, and household age.
22I do not consider garnisheeing of interest rate income because incorporating it greatly
increases the computational intensity. Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) mention that very
few households save after declaring bankruptcy in their set-up, and it was not quantitatively
important.
23Such as the work of Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), Akyol and Athreya (2011), and
Meh and Terajima (2008).
24This assumption constraints the model in a partial equilibrium setting. One might worry
that the level of entrepreneurship might affects the overall capital market, which in turn affect
the equilibrium risk-free interest rate. However, these kind of second order effects are likely
small: first, the U.S. has an open capital market, in which the risk-free interest rate is deter-
mined internationally. Second, the small business loan market in the U.S. is relatively small,
valued at $300 billion, only accounts for 0.3% of the U.S. $101 trillion capital market.
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The price of a bond issued by a household of age j, an ability level ρ, with
current labour productivity shock , and portfolio choice (d, k) is denoted by
qd(d, k, , ρ, j).
When making loans to households, intermediaries maximize the expected
profit and incur a transaction cost τ per unit of loan. In equilibrium, per-
fect competition ensures that intermediaries earn zero expected profits on each
loan they issue.25 The actual realized profit from each loan can be positive or
negative.
2.4.4 Timing within the Period
The model timing is as follows. At the beginning of a period, households ob-
serve their labour productivity and business productivity shocks (, θ). Given
the realized value of (i, θi), their beginning-of-period portfolio (d,k) and occu-
pation e, households decide whether to file for bankruptcy or not. Note that
households under garnishment are not allowed to file for bankruptcy. If a
household files for bankruptcy, income is then garnisheed and assets above
x¯ are seized by the creditor; all unsecured debts are discharged, and the house-
hold is left with disposable income A as specified in (2.2) or (2.3), depending on
occupation status. If a household is under garnishment (i.e., having filed for
bankruptcy in the recent past), income is then garnisheed, and it is left with
(2.4). Given the value of disposable income A, households then choose their
25This assumption is stronger than the typical zero profit condition, since we usually assume
that the financial institution would make zero expected profit from its entire loan portfolio,
which means it is possible to cross-subsidize between loans. The zero profit condition here
does not allow intermediaries to do that.
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current consumption c, occupation for the next period e′, and portfolio (d′, k′).
The above is summarized in Figure 2.1.
2.4.5 Household’s Problem
I define Vj(, A, g, ρ) to be the post-bankruptcy decision value function of an age-
j household. Similarly, define Wj(d, k, , θ, ρ, g, e) as the pre-bankruptcy decision
value function of an age-j household whose beginning-of-period shocks, port-
folio, and status as (, θ), (d, k) and (ρ, g, e), respectively. The value function at
age VJ+1(.) is set to 0. The pre-bankruptcy decision value function of an age-j
household is given by:
Wj(d, k, , θ, ρ, g, e) = max
b∈{0,1}
Vj(, A, g, ρ) (2.5)
where different disposable income A are defined as in (2.1) and (2.4) for b = 0,
(2.2) and (2.3) for b = 1. The post bankruptcy decision value function is defined
as follows:
Vj(, A, g, ρ) = max
c,d′,k′,e′
u(
c
nj
) + βE[Wj+1(d
′, k′, ′, θ′, ρ, g′, e′)|, ρ] (2.6)
subject to
c
(1− λ)I(g,b) + k
′ − qd(d′, k′, , ρ, j)d′ = A− L(k, e′, d)ζk (2.7)
g′ = G if b = 1 (2.8)
g′ = g − 1 if g > 1 (2.9)
c > 0, k′ ∈ {0, ...k¯} (2.10)
Equation (2.7) is the budget constraint. The first term on the right-hand side
is the disposable income at hand, A. On the left-hand side, c is the current
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consumption, d′ is the bond position that is multiplied by its associated market
price, and k′ is the business capital for the next period. I(g, b) is an identifica-
tion function for transaction cost, which takes a value of 1 if g > 0 or b = 1, or
0 otherwise. If e′ = 0, the household chooses to become a worker in the next
period. If e′ = 1 and k′ > 0, the household becomes an entrepreneur in the next
period. L(·) is an identification function for liquidation cost; it takes the value
of 1 if an entrepreneur household decides to liquidate its business without fil-
ing for bankruptcy, or 0 in all other cases. Equations (2.8) and (2.9) are the law
of motion for garnishment status.
2.4.6 Problem of Intermediaries
A competitive financial market implies that intermediaries make zero profits
on unsecured debt made to each type of household. Thus, there is no cross-
subsidization across different types of borrowers. Now, denote φ(d′, k′, , ρ, j) as
the probability that a household of age j, the ability level ρ, current labour
shock , and portfolio choice (d′, k′) will declare bankruptcy tomorrow. The zero
profit condition on loans to each type of household implies that:
qd(d′, k′, , ρ, j) = q¯d{1− φ(d′, k′, , ρ, j)[1− E( Γ
d′
|b = 1)]} (2.11)
where q¯d = 1
1+rf+τ
is the price of unsecured loans (d′ > 0) when the proba-
bility of default is zero. E( Γ
d′ |b = 1) is the expected rate of recovery through
garnishment of income and liquidation of assets, where Γ is defined as:
Γ =
 γmax{j y¯j − w¯, 0}+GP (j, ), if e = 0;γmax{f(θ, k)− w¯, 0}+ (1− ζ) max{(1− δ)k − x¯, 0}+GP (j, ), if e = 1.
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where GP (j, ) is the expected present value of post-bankruptcy income gar-
nishment, which only depends on the household’s age, current labour produc-
tivity shock, and the length of garnishments, that is:
GP (j, ) = E[
min{G,J−j}∑
t=1
(q¯d)tγ[max{j+ty¯j+t − w¯, 0}]|j] (2.12)
Note that these garnishments are discounted by q¯d, since these repayments
resemble default-risk free loans.
2.4.7 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Given a bankruptcy rule (G, x¯, w¯, γ, ζ) and risk-free interest rate
rf and transaction cost τ , an equilibrium is a set of value functions, V and
W , and policy functions d, k, e and b, a default probability φ(d′, k′, , ρ, j), and a
pricing function qd such that:
1. the value functions V and W solve the household problem, and d, k, e and
b are the associated optimal policy functions; and
2. the bond prices qd are determined by zero profit condition (2.11);
3. The default probabilities are correct: φ(d′, k′, , ρ, j) = E(bj+1(d′, k′, , ρ)).
2.5 Benchmark Parameterizations
The benchmark is calibrated to match several key moments from the U.S. econ-
omy. The parameters to be calibrated are related to households preferences
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and demographic, labour market income process, entrepreneurial production,
intermediation rates, and the bankruptcy system.
2.5.1 Demographics and Preference
The model period is 1 year. Households live for 57 periods. Agents begin life
at age 20 and retire at 65, which counts as the first 45 periods in which agents
receive income shocks and entrepreneurial productivity shocks, while the last
12 periods correspond to retirement.26 I adopt the family size life cycle profile
from Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), which is based on U.S. census data
for 1990.27 I assume there are five levels of entrepreneurial abilities; from low
to high, are {ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4, ρ5}, while the fraction of population endowed with
each ability level is {10%, 20%, 40%, 20%, 10%},28 respectively.
The period utility function is u(c) = c1−σ
1−σ , where
1
σ
is the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution. The annual discount factor is set at 0.96 and σ = 2.
26I assume that households die at 20 + 57 = 77 years old, since the reported average life
expectancy is around 76-78 for the U.S.
27They use the average of equivalence scales as reported in Fernandez-Villaverde and
Krueger (2001).
28This is to approximate a normal distribution. I want to work with the most general case
here. One can argue that entrepreneurial ability is correlated with education (Akyol and
Athreya (2011)), experience, race, sex and other things. Although, there is no one single ob-
servable characteristic dominantly determines it. But most would agree that the ability dis-
tribution should have a thin tail on the right. In fact, in this model the top two ability groups
determine most of the action in the entrepreneurial sector, thus the predictions of the model
does not change for most distribution with a thin tail on the right.
32
2.5.2 Labour Productivity
The average age-profile of earning y¯j is from Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt
(2007). The persistent idiosyncratic shock, , is assumed to follow a four-state
Markov process. I set ρ = 0.99, and σ2 = 0.016, and the transitory shock is set
to σ2η = 0.068. When discretizing the transitory shock, I assume that 5% of the
population receives a positive (negative) shock each period. The procedure used
to approximate this AR(1) process using a Markov process is from Tauchen
and Hussey (1991). There is no uncertainty during retirement in which in-
come is composed of 30% of the household’s pre-retirement period (45th period)
labour income plus 35% of the average labour income of the economy. I assume
that households face no uncertainty during retirement because rational agents
should have perfectly diversified up to that time.
2.5.3 Intermediation Sector
The risk-free interest rate is set to 4%, which is the average return on capital
reported by Mcgrattan and Prescott (2001). The transaction cost is set at 4%,
which is used by Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007).29 This implies a risk-
free return on savings for a one-year period of 4% and a risk -free lending rate
of 8%.
29They claim the one they used is slightly less than the average cost of making credit card
loans reported by Evans and Schmalensee (2005).
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2.5.4 Entrepreneurial Production
I pick the group of Φρ(θ) and the set of θs such that the implied mean and
standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) from the benchmark model would
match the corresponding statistics for sample firms in the 1993 Survey of Small
Business Financing from Herranz, Krasa, and Villamil (2009). The support of θ
has five elements (see Table 2.3). The lowest state is −3.14. This implies that if
θ = −3.14, a small firm loses not only the depreciated capital, but more than its
capital stock.30 Typically, a bankrupt firm, is not only indebted to its banks.31
These firms are usually in much severe financial distress; they frequently owe
their suppliers, employees, and sometimes to their customers as well.32
The liquidation cost ζ is set to 35%, which is close to the mean reported for
U.S. companies by Shleifer and Vishny (1992). The return to scale parameter,
α, is used to match the fraction of entrepreneurs in the data. The fraction of
population that is owner-manager of a business is 10.6% in the U.S.33 Unlike
Meh and Terajima (2008), I do not assume that there is a minimal size require-
ment to start a business, as a household cannot be an entrepreneur and worker
at the same time in this model.34 Finally, the annual deprecation rate is set to
8%.
30Note that under this setting, smaller firms are riskier and more profitable at the same
time, because the marginal return (loss) to capital is higher for smaller firms (this is due to
diminishing return to capital). According to Herranz, Krasa, and Villamil (2009)’s calculation,
more than 2% of firms in their sample have a return to assets ratio lower than -100%.
31Again, these bank loans are usually secured by equipment, land, etc.
32Trade credit is very important to small business, as means of financing. Trade credit as
share of all small business debts in the U.S. is comparable to debts from financial institutions
(Berger and Udell, 1998). Obviously they take the form of unsecured debts.
33From the 2003 survey of Global Entrepreneur Monitor (Reynolds, Bygrave, Autio, and
Arenius, 2004).
34Adding minimal size requirements does not seem to affect the result.
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2.5.5 Bankruptcy Law
There are five parameters of the bankruptcy regime that need to be chosen:
periods of post-bankruptcy income garnishment G, income exemption w¯, asset
exemption x¯, the garnishment rate γ, and transaction cost λ. Under Chapter
7, G is set to 1 since Chapter 7 indicates that filers would have to act in “good
faith,” which is usually interpreted as some period of repayment. γ is cali-
brated to match the fraction of entrepreneur bankruptcies. Asset exemption x¯
is set to 0.9, which is in line with the estimates of $50,000 used by Akyol and
Athreya (2011).35 The transaction cost is set to 15%, though previous studies
have tried to capture income garnishments, stigma cost, or even the cost of
exclusion from the credit market by one garnisheeing parameter. It does not
seem to fit this study, because income garnishment rules are specified in all
countries’ bankruptcy regimes except for the U.S. Income exemption level w¯ is
set to 0 for the same reason.
Using the same logic as Meh and Terajima (2008), the bankruptcy rate of
entrepreneurs (1.66%) is obtained by multiplying the fraction of entrepreneur
bankruptcies and the overall bankruptcy rate, and then dividing by the fraction
of the entrepreneurs in the economy.
I do not try to match the total personal bankruptcy filing because I want to
concentrate on entrepreneurship, and there is no expense shock in the model.
Thus, I target only the fraction of households filing bankruptcy for the two rea-
sons modeled in this chapter: business failure and job loss, which accounts for
35The original source is from Rodriguez, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rior-Rull (2002).
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about 0.378% of the population. 36 A large fraction of personal bankruptcies
are caused by surprise expenses in the U.S., for instance, medical expenses
count for roughly one third of total bankruptcy cases (Domowitz and Sartain,
1999).37 In addition, family issues such as divorces (22.1% from Sullivan, War-
ren, and Westbrook (1999)) and expenses associated with an unplanned child
also play a significant role. In this model, the only reason for a worker to file
bankruptcy is job loss (having a very low labour income shock). Sullivan, War-
ren, and Westbrook (1999) claimed that 67% of bankruptcies were filed because
of job loss, but this number has been criticized as exaggerated. The survey of
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) shows that only 23% of filers gave job
loss as their primary or secondary reason for filing (White, 2007), which is the
number use here.
2.5.6 Fit of the benchmark model
The benchmark calibration fits very well with all the preceding targets, as
presented in Table 2.6. In particular, the model replicates the level of en-
trepreneurship, and more importantly the distribution of the return on assets
really well, since this is the key to capture just how risky running a small busi-
ness is in the U.S. In addition, as shown in Table 2.7, the benchmark model
also matches the hump shape of age-profile of U.S. entrepreneurs and the age-
profile of bankruptcy filers fairly well.
36(20% (business failure) + 23% (job loss)) × 0.88% (fraction of bankrupts among population)
= 0.378%
37Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1999 report that only 19.3% of bankrupts claim medical
expenses as the cause of bankruptcy, although Jacoby, Sullivan, and Warren 2000 suggest that
34% of bankrupts owed large amounts of medical debt.
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2.6 Results
This section is organized as follows. The first part describes the counterfactual
experiments. The second part present the results in detail, and analyzes the
basic forces at work in the model.
The first set of three counterfactual exercises are designed to study the ef-
fect on the benchmark model when altering one aspect of personal bankruptcy
regime at a time: in the first set, I increase the periods of garnishment one year
at a time from 1 to 9 years, and present the result in Table 2.8. In the second
set, I study the effect of changes in the fraction of garnishment γ, the result is
presented in Table 2.9. And the third set of counterfactuals exercises deals with
changes in asset exemptions, with the result presented in Table 2.10. The fol-
lowing key statistics are reported for each set: 1) the level of entrepreneurship
measured as a fraction of households being entrepreneurs, 2) the average size
of businesses in the entrepreneurial sector, 3) the average productivity of busi-
nesses in the entrepreneurial sector relative to the benchmark U.S. economy,
4) the fraction of new/exiting businesses, and 5) the fraction of entrepreneurs
within each ability group. All numbers are reported on an annual basis.
The fourth set of counterfactuals are designed to examine the impact of
alternative personal bankruptcy regimes from Canada, UK, Germany, and
France on the steady-state equilibrium outcome of the calibrated U.S. Econ-
omy. Thus, for each counterfactual, I only alternate those parameter values
associated with the bankruptcy law, namely the length of garnishment periods
G, the garnishment rate γ, the income exemption w¯, and the asset exemption
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x¯. The bankruptcy parameters used in these four counterfactuals as well as
for the benchmark are reported in Table 2.11. When available, these num-
bers are directly calculated as specified in bankruptcy laws. The length of
post-bankruptcy garnisheeing is: G=3 for the UK, G=6 for Germany, and G=9
for France. As for Canada, although the bankruptcy law specifies that gar-
nishment can last up to 3 years, the majority of debts are discharged within
9 months, which makes this bankruptcy procedure quite similar to Chapter
7, so I set G equal to 1 in that situation. The income exemption used for
the UK, Canada and Germany counterfactuals, w¯ = 0.375, is obtained from
dividing $21,000 by $56,000 (the average income used by Meh and Terajima
(2008)). Similarly, that number is 0.35 for the French counterfactual. Once
again, the same set of five key statistics are reported in Table 2.12 and 2.13
for these counterfactuals; in addition, the fraction of entrepreneurs declaring
bankruptcy and the total fraction of households declaring bankruptcy are also
reported. All numbers are reported on an annual basis. A quick glance will
show that the model does a good job of matching the facts described in section
2: less lenient bankruptcy systems lead to 1) lower levels of entrepreneurship,
2) higher fractions of larger, older firms in the economy, and 3) lower business
turnover rates. A more detailed breakdown of the results follows.
First, the bankruptcy regime has a significant impact on the “extensive”
margin of entrepreneurship. This can be seen in the first row of Tables 2.8, 2.9,
2.10 and 2.12: variations in the post-bankruptcy garnishments appear to have
a large impact on the level of entrepreneurship. The fraction of entrepreneurs
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decreases monotonically as the length and fraction of post-bankruptcy garnish-
ments increases: from 10.71% under the benchmark case to 7.32% when length
of garnishment reaches 9 periods, and to 9.47% when fraction of income gar-
nisheed increases to 100%. It should not be a surprise that variation in the
length of garnishments has such a large impact, because the present value of
expected amount of income garnishments (loss of future income) goes up al-
most twice when garnishment periods goes from 1 to 2 periods, and goes up
almost 740% when increased to 9 periods, not counting the 15% transaction
cost. Furthermore, exclusion from borrowing greatly reduces bankrupt house-
holds’ ability to smooth their consumption across time, and exclusion from en-
trepreneurship takes away big part of their earning potentials.
There appears to be an inverted U-relationship between the asset exemp-
tion level and the level of entrepreneurship: the fraction of entrepreneurs in-
creases from 10.02% when x¯ = 0.05 (roughly $2800) to 10.71% when x¯ = 0.9,
then declines to 10.21% when x¯ = 2 (roughly $11,200). This is mainly caused
by an inverted U-relationship between the asset exemption level and the num-
ber of moderate-ability entrepreneurs, as shown on the second last row of Table
2.10. It suggests that the borrowing cost effect of bankruptcy law on moderate-
ability households’ decision dominates for low level of asset exemptions, but
once pass the current average U.S. level, insurance effect tend to dominates.
As for high-ability households, insurance dominates throughout this exemp-
tion range.
Lastly, when different countries’ regimes are adopted, the level of entrepreneur-
ship decreases from 10.71% under the U.S. benchmark case to 9.75% under
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the Canadian regime, 9.1% under the UK regime, 7.32% under the Germany
regime, and 6.43% under the French regime. Notably, most of these changes
are coming from the lower ability households. As shown in Tables 2.8, 2.9,
2.10 and 2.12, the fraction of entrepreneurs out of the highest ability house-
holds barely changed for every set of benchmark counterfactuals; in fact, it
is always within the range of 60%-65%. There seems to exist an U-shaped
relationship between the level of entrepreneurship and the “forgiveness” of
bankruptcy law within this high-ability group when it comes to the length of
garnishment: it declined first from 62.9% when G = 1 to 60.3% when G = 4,
then increased to 63.8% when G = 9. This result suggests that, even for high-
ability entrepreneurs, the bankruptcy punishments need to be really tough
for the lowered borrowing cost to start encouraging entrepreneurship. When it
comes to varying the level of garnishment and asset exemptions, the level of en-
trepreneurship within this high-ability group tends to increase monotonically
with the forgiveness of the bankruptcy regime. On the other hand, the fraction
of entrepreneurs for the households in the next ability level dropped drasti-
cally and monotonically as the bankruptcy regimes become less lenient for all
but the case of asset exemption level. There is an inverted U-relationship be-
tween the asset exemption and the fraction of entrepreneurs in this “moderate”
ability group.
The intuition behind the vastly different effects of bankruptcy regime on
different ability households is clear: severe failures are less likely to occur for
high-ability entrepreneurs. Since bankruptcy only occurs in these bad states,
changes in the insurance effect and borrowing cost from varying bankruptcy
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policies are relatively small for high-ability households. As for moderate-ability
households, failure is more likely to occur, so variation in the bankruptcy regime
has a much larger impact on their occupational decisions, and it appears that
the insurance effect completely dominates the borrowing effect. It is clear that
when the length of garnishment is high, as it is under the French and Ger-
many bankruptcy regimes, little insurance value is provided against failure
since bankruptcy filers would have very little disposable income for 6 to 10
years after filing. Consequently, the entrepreneur bankruptcy rate drops more
than five times and the overall bankruptcy rate drops close to four times from
the benchmark U.S. case to the France counterfactual.
As for business dynamics, the fraction of new firms decreases as the regime
becomes less lenient. This is due to two reasons: 1) as the fraction of bet-
ter firms increases, failure in the pool of active businesses is less likely to oc-
cur, and 2) filing for bankruptcy and quitting business become more expensive.
Similarly, the turnover rate decreased quite a bit, from 10.41% to 6.98% from
the benchmark model to the French counterfactual.38
Now let us turn to the impact on the “intensive” margin of entrepreneur-
ship, namely the size of firms. For the U.S. benchmark model, the average
firm capital size is 15.23, which corresponds to $852,000, which went up to just
over $1,000,000 when I set the length of garnishment to G = 9 under the first
set of counterfactual exercises, and went up even higher for the counterfactual
under the French regime. This shift is for two reasons. First, the rate of re-
turn for capital is higher for high-ability entrepreneurs, so as the fraction of
38This is a static model, so turnover rate is simply two times the fraction of new firms.
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“better” firm increases, the average size increases. Second, though having a
fairly small effect, the lowered borrowing cost from tougher systems allows en-
trepreneurs to borrow more and accumulate wealth faster. On the other hand,
the capital size appears to have a U-shape relationship with asset exemption,
this again being due to the change in ability composition of entrepreneurs. As
discussed above, there is a inverted U-relationship between asset exemption
and the fraction of entrepreneurs among moderate-ability households: as the
share of moderate-ability entrepreneurs goes down, the average size of busi-
nesses goes up.
When it comes to comparing the impact of different aspects of personal
bankruptcy regimes, the length of post-bankruptcy punishment clearly has
the largest impact: prolong it to 9 periods alone lead to a 31.65% drop in
the level of entrepreneurship, a 7.4% increase in average productivity, and a
26.1% increase in the average size of firm capital. It has a very large impact
on the occupational choice of the moderate-ability households: again, changing
from the benchmark case to 9 periods of garnishment caused the fraction of en-
trepreneurs among this ability group to decrease from 21.97% to 4.7%, which
accounted for the majority of the change in the level of entrepreneurship. The
level of income garnisheed also had moderate impact on entrepreneurship: in-
creasing the fraction from 25% to 100% lead to a 13.2% drop in the level of
entrepreneurship, a 5.7% increase in average productivity, and a 10.3% in-
crease in the average size of firm capital. On the other hand, changes in asset
exemption have only modest impact on the entrepreneurial sector.
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The changes in the ability composition of entrepreneur households asso-
ciated with tougher bankruptcy regimes result in an increase in the average
productivity in the entrepreneurial sector, which went up 7.4% when I increase
the length of garnishment to 9 periods, went up 5% when I increase the frac-
tion of garnishment to 100%, and went up 2.2% when the asset exemption is
dropped to 0.05 (roughly $3,000). In fact, the adoption of the French regime led
to a 8.3% increase in the average productivity. This result suggests that if the
quality of entrepreneurs is the main policy concern, then those less “forgiving”
regimes are more favorable in comparison to the U.S. Chapter 7 system. One
should note, however, that as the level of entrepreneurs increases, the overall
output in the economy increases despite the drop in average firm size. This is
because for any risk-averse household to run a business, the expected return
from the business has to be greater than the expected wage income plus the
risk-free gross return from the invested capital (whether internally or exter-
nally financed). More specifically, the difference would have to be large enough
to compensate for the risk these entrepreneur households are bearing. Thus,
the aggregate output is the highest in the benchmark U.S. case and the lowest
in the French counterfactual, although the firms in the French counterfactual
are bigger on average, but it is not enough to offset the drop in the overall level
of entrepreneurship.
One should be careful when interpreting these partial equilibrium results,
because aggregate movements of labour between the entrepreneurial sector
and the corporate sector, and changes in the aggregate capital stock (which
affect the risk-free rate of return) are not captured here. For instance, an
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increase in the level of entrepreneurship means fewer workers in the corpo-
rate sector, so the wage rate in the corporate sector would rise, which discour-
ages entrepreneurship by increasing the opportunity cost. Many have argued
(Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton,
1989) that more potential entrepreneurs in an environment with default lead
to higher stock of capital, because entrepreneurs want to save more proportion-
ally to avoid borrowing constraints. This leads to a lower equilibrium risk-free
interest rate, which encourages entrepreneurship (this effect amplifies my re-
sult, as a higher level of entrepreneurship encourages more households to run
businesses). On the other hand, a higher level of entrepreneurship increases
the demand for capital, which drives the risk-free interest rate higher. A higher
risk-free rate discourages entrepreneurship and limits entrepreneurs’ ability to
invest in efficient size. But, it is unlikely that these second-order effects will
reverse the main results of this chapter.
2.6.1 Welfare Analysis
Ex-ante welfare gains or losses for each of the counterfactuals are presented
in Table 2.7. These numbers are calculated as consumption equivalence in
gains and losses when compared to the benchmark U.S. case. The first row
reports the overall welfare changes,39 and the following five rows report the
decomposition of these gains and losses among different ability groups.
39This is calculated by assuming that before households are born, households do not know
their entrepreneurial ability, but know the distribution of abilities among population.
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The first row of Table 14 shows that overall welfare increases as the per-
sonal bankruptcy laws become less lenient. The U.S. benchmark case implies
the lowest ex-ante welfare, and the French counterfactual has the highest.
However, when separated in to different ability groups, the two groups with
the highest entrepreneurial ability actually experience welfare gain when the
bankruptcy regime gets more lenient, with the gains being higher for the top
ability group. The three groups with lowest ability levels (pure worker types),
on the other hand, all have welfare losses when the leniency of the bankruptcy
regime increases. This result implies that entrepreneurs actually prefer the
U.S. regime, which gives the most insurance value, and workers prefer the
French regime, which gives the lowest borrowing cost. This is because labour
income risk is more moderate when comparing to productivity risks.40 Because
they face lower risks, worker households care more about the ability to smooth
consumption over time through borrowing. Since a more lenient bankruptcy
regime limits their ability to borrow, their welfare drops.41 On the other hand,
entrepreneurial households care more about insurance value provided by the
bankruptcy system. Because productivity risk is larger relative to labour in-
come risks, the effect of insurance value outweighs the effect from increased
borrowing cost for entrepreneur households. Thus, their welfare improves as
the regime become more lenient. Lastly, the overall welfare decreases as the
40In fact, labour shock never go to the negative region, although productivity risk did (the
lowest shock being -3.14).
41This result may disappear if the type of expense shock from Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt
(2007) is incorporated here. However, as they mentioned in their paper, the sources and mag-
nitude of expense shock differs across countries. A more detailed discussion is offered in the
conclusion.
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personal bankruptcy laws become more lenient because worker households out-
weighs entrepreneur households in proportions.
2.7 Conclusion
The main finding of this chapter is that variations in bankruptcy regimes
have little effect on high-ability households’ occupational choices, change in the
length (periods) of post-bankruptcy punishment appears to have the largest
impact on entrepreneurship, and asset exemption had only a modest effect.
When it comes to moderate-ability households’ occupational choices, the insur-
ance effect completely dominates the borrowing cost effect. This result sug-
gests that a very lenient bankruptcy regime like the U.S. Chapter 7 system
does encourage entrepreneurship, though it lowers the average productivity in
the entrepreneurial sector, but increases the overall production in the economy.
The result also helps explain the U.S.’ higher turnover rate and lower average
business size compared to other developed nations.
The model suggests that worker households prefer less lenient regimes due
to moderate wage income risks. A large fraction of U.S. personal bankruptcies
are due to medical causes and other surprise expenses rather than income loss
or business failures. Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) showed that once
these expense shocks are incorporated, given reasonable parameter values42
the Chapter 7 regime leads to a welfare gain on comparison to a no-bankruptcy
42Most of variables concerning labour income shocks and financial intermediation used here
are taken directly from their paper.
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(no leniency) regime. It is reasonable to say that once expense shock is incor-
porated in this model, both worker households and entrepreneur households
in the U.S. would prefer the U.S. regime. Unlike the U.S., the other four coun-
tries all have some form of universal health-care systems. Thus, the fraction
of bankruptcies due to medical reasons is very small.43 In addition to low ex-
posure to surprise medical expenses, workers in Europe also enjoy better job
security (Lazear, 1990) and less earning inequity;44 which means that they
face even fewer risks compare than their U.S. counterparts. Because they face
less risks, they would prefer a less lenient system because the insurance value
provided by bankruptcy does not matter for them. However, given the large
differences between the welfare impact on workers and entrepreneurs; policy
makers, especially in Europe, should think about treating personal bankrupt-
cies caused by business failures separately.
This model can be extended to several directions. In this chapter, I assume
that the entrepreneurial ability is immediately observed by households and in-
termediaries. Suppose that households and banks can only observe the history
of business outcomes, but not the actual ability level. In that situation, house-
holds would like to start businesses earlier in life when they are most financial
constrained, while at the same time mature firms enjoy a lower borrowing cost.
Obviously, this would greatly increase the computational intensity as belief up-
dating comes into play. The other interesting direction is taking the effect of
“learning by doing” from running a business into the model. In that situation,
43Although most medical practices in France are operated privately, patients are reimbursed
by the state for up to 85% of medical costs.
44See Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007).
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the potential earnings from being an entrepreneur also increase with experi-
ence, rather than remaining constant as they are in this chapter.
Another interesting extension is to look at entrepreneurship in different in-
dustries. Since different industries are inherently different in their riskiness,
bankruptcy policy may have adverse effects. However, one must pay atten-
tion to more than just debt contract when considering such industries, because
equity-type financing with ownership clearly suits those very risky sectors (i.e.,
high-tech).
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Table 2.1: Personal Bankruptcy Law Across Countries Prior 2005
France Germany UK Canada U.S. Chapter 7
Asset exemption modest householdgoods exemption
modest household
goods exemption
household goods
and pension
exemption,
homestead
exemption is
around $2000
varies across
provinces, largest
homestead
exemption is
$40, 000
varies across
states, some
states with
unlimited
homestead
exemption
Income
exemption
$6000 for singles,
$15000 for family of
three
$21000 for couples,
up to $38, 000 for
families per year
“reasonable
domestic needs”
$21, 000 for singles;
$40, 000 for families
of four
unlimited
Percent of
nonexempt
income that goes
to creditors
increase from 5%
to 100% when
income exceeds
$20, 000 for singles
or $23, 000 for
family of four
100% in years 1-3,
90% in year 4 and
85% in year 5
30%-50% 50% None
length of
repayment
obligation
8-10 years 6 years up to 3 years 9 months to 3 years None
other
punishments
discharge
contingent on
debtors’ efforts to
find/hold a job
discharge
contingent on
debtors’ efforts to
find/hold a job
debtor cannot
borrow, manage a
business, hold
some public offices
for 3 years
debtor cannot
borrow, manage a
business, hold
some public offices
before discharge
repeat filing
not allowed for
6 years
Sources: all information are taken from White’s (2007) summary table. Her original sources are Ziegel
(2007), Kilborn (2004), Kilborn (2005), BankruptcyCanada.com, The Insolvency Service (2007), and Ram-
say (2003). All figures are in U.S. dollars.
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Table 2.2: Entrepreneurship Across Countries
Source France Germany UK Canada U.S.
Global En-
trepreneurship
Monitor, 2004
% of population that is
owner-manager 4.22% 7% 8.8% 9.7% 10.6%
Fraction of new firms
out of all firms 9.0% 8.4% 11.3% 12.7% 13.9%
Flash
Eurobarometer
Survey 160,
(2004), % report
as
self-employment
out of survey
replies
Entrepreneurs 10% 18% 18% N.A. 22%
Business younger than
3 years 33% 40% 44% N.A. 62.5%
(Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger,
and Scarpetta,
2007)
Fraction of all
employer-firms with
less than 20 employees
82% 89.6%* N.A. 86.7% 88%
Entry/Exit rate 11%/7.5% 6%/6%* N.A. 11%/10.5% 12%/10%
Mills and
Timmins 2006
Fraction of
zero-employee firms N.A. N.A. 69.3% 58.2% 77.3%
Note: At the time there is no personal bankruptcy law in Germany. Though other data are
taken after 1999, it should be clear that Germany’s economy might still be in transition.
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Table 2.3: Business Shocks
state 1 2 3 4 5
productivity θ -3.14 -1.47 0.2 1.87 3.52
Ability
levels
ρ1 0.165 0.31 0.33 0.17 0.025
ρ2 0.13 0.275 0.33 0.205 0.06
ρ3 0.095 0.24 0.33 0.24 0.095
ρ4 0.06 0.205 0.33 0.275 0.13
ρ5 0.025 0.17 0.33 0.31 0.165
The probabilities of occurrence for ability level ρ3 is the five state approximation of the normal
distribution N(0.2, 2). Other groups’ probability distributions are obtained by shifting weights
of different states. For instance, Φρ4 is obtained by shifting 7% weights from the low
productivity states 1 and 2 to high productivity states 4 and 5, Φρ5 is obtained by shifting 14%
from the low productivity states 1 and 2 to high productivity states 4 and 5. similarly, Φρ2 and
Φρ1 are obtained by shifting weights from high productivity states to low productivity states.
Table 2.4: Moments Targeted in the Benchmark in Annual Values
Moments Values Source
Fraction of Entrepreneurs 10.6% GEM (2003)
Overall annual bankruptcy rate (job loss+business failure) 0.378% Own calculation∗
Fraction of Entrepreneurs declare bankruptcy 1.66% Own calculation∗∗
*obtained by adding the fraction of bankrupts are entrepreneurs(20%, from Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1999))
and fraction of bankrupts reports job-loss as filing reason (23%, PSID) then multiplied by the over all bankruptcy rate
(0.88% from Athreya (2004)).
**obtained by multiplying the fraction of bankrupts are entrepreneurs(20%, from Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook
(1999)) and the the over all bankruptcy rate (0.88% from Athreya (2004)) then divide by the fraction of the entrepreneurs
in the economy (10.6%, from GEM 2003 (Reynolds, Bygrave, Autio, and Arenius, 2004)).
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Table 2.5: Calibrated Parameters of the Benchmark Economy
Parameters Values
Fixed
Parameters
σ Relative risk aversion 2
β Discount factor 0.96
J Lifetime 57
ρ coefficient of autocorrelation of labour income 0.99
σ2,3 Variance of persistent labour shock 0.016
σ2η Variance of transitory labour shock 0.068
δ Depreciation parameter 8%
ζ Liquidation cost 35%
rf Risk free rate 4%
τ Annual transaction costs when making loans 4%
x¯ Asset exemption 0.9
Endogenously
calibrated
parameters
γ Income garnishment rate 0.433
α Degree of return to scale 0.643
λ Transaction cost for bankrupts 15%
Table 2.6: Moments Targeted in the Benchmark in Annual Values
Moments Data Benchmark
Fraction of Entrepreneurs 10.6% 10.71%
Overall annual bankruptcy rate (job loss+business failure) 0.378% 0.391%
Fraction of Entrepreneurs declare bankruptcy 1.66% 1.69%
Mean of Return on Assets 1.3 1.313
Standard Deviation of Return on Assets 1.575 1.612
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Table 2.7: Age Profiles of Entrepreneurs and Bankrupts
Fraction Of Population Being Entrepreneur By Age Group
Age Group Below 35 35-44 45-54 Above 55
Model 6.8% 14.3% 12.7% 12.6%
Data 5.6% 12.5% 15.4% 11.4%
Fraction Of Population Filed For Bankruptcy By Age Group
Age Group Below 35 35-44 45-54 Above 55
Model 0.33% 0.44% 0.39% 0.36%
Data (Job loss and
business failure only)
0.31% 0.38% 0.37% 0.26%
Table 2.8: Variation In Length Of Garnishment
G 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
% Entre. 10.71 10.12 9.63 9.13 8.75 8.47 8.13 7.83 7.32
Average size 15.23 15.67 16.04 16.39 16.83 17.47 18.09 18.57 19.21
Ave productivity 1 1.01 1.029 1.036 1.043 1.049 1.055 1.062 1.074
Entry/Exit % 5.21 5.055 4.92 4.75 4.43 4.09 3.91 3.79 3.55
% Entre./ρ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% Entre./ρ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% Entre./ρ3 0.025% 0.01% 0.004% 0 0 0 0 0 0
% Entre./ρ4 21.97% 17.45% 16.2% 15.5% 13.3% 11.5% 9.4% 7.6% 4.7%
% Entre./ρ5 62.9% 62.3% 61.4% 60.3% 60.9% 61.7% 62.5% 63.1% 63.8%
Fraction of Income Garnisheed γ = 0.433, Asset Exemption x¯ = 0.9, Income
Exemption w¯ = 0
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Table 2.9: Variation In Fraction Garnisheed
γ Fraction garnisheed 0.25 0.433 0.65 1
% of Entrepreneur 10.91 10.71 10.27 9.47
Average size 15.01 15.23 15.76 16.55
Average productivity 0.993 1 1.019 1.05
Entry/Exit % 5.24 5.21 5.13 4.97
% of Entre./ρ1 0 0 0 0
% of Entre./ρ2 0 0 0 0
% of Entre./ρ3 0.024% 0.025% 0.019% 0
% of Entre./ρ4 22.88% 21.97% 19.98% 16.1%
% of Entre./ρ5 63.24% 62.9% 62.65% 62.51%
Length of garnisheeing G = 1, Asset exemption x¯ = 0.9, Income exemption w¯ = 0
Table 2.10: Variation In Asset Exemption Garnisheed
x¯ asset exemption 0.05 0.45 0.9 1.5 2
% of Entrepreneur 10.02 10.43 10.71 10.52 10.21
Average size 15.87 15.54 15.23 15.59 15.76
Average productivity 1.022 1.01 1 1.017 1.02
Entry/Exit % 5.09 5.15 5.21 5.18 5.12
% of Entre./ρ1 0 0 0 0 0
% of Entre./ρ2 0 0 0 0 0
% of Entre./ρ3 0.014% 0.024% 0.025% 0.027% 0.017%
% of Entre./ρ4 18.98% 20.08% 21.97% 20.96% 19.22%
% of Entre./ρ5 62.23% 62.59% 62.9% 63.26% 63.65%
Length of Garnisheeing G = 1, fraction of garnisheed γ = 0.433 , Income
exemption w¯ = 0
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Table 2.11: Bankruptcy Parameters Used In Counterfactuals
Parameters France Germany England Canada U.S.
Periods of post-bankruptcy
garnishments G 9 6 3 1 1
Asset exemptions x¯ 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.35 0.9
Income exemptions w¯ 0.335 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.0Fraction of income
garnisheed γ 0.95 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.433
Table 2.12: Counterfactual (Regimes Resemble Other Countries’ Laws) Results
France Germany UK Canada U.S.
% of Entrepreneurs 6.43% 7.32% 9.1% 9.75% 10.71%
% of Entrepreneur that
bankrupts 0.32% 0.38% 1.32% 1.57% 1.69%
Average Size 19.78 18.43 17.23 16.07 15.23
Average productivity 1.083 1.068 1.044 1.013 1
Fraction of New/All Businesses 3.49% 3.77% 4.32% 4.97% 5.21%
Overall fraction of Bankrupts 0.091% 0.098% 0.278% 0.331% 0.391%
Table 2.13: Fraction Of Entrepreneurs Within Different Ability Level Groups
France Germany UK Canada U.S.
ρ1 0 0 0 0 0
ρ2 0 0 0 0 0
ρ3 0 0 0 0.002% 0.025%
ρ4 0.0% 4.85% 14.65% 17.65% 21.97%
ρ5 64.3% 63.5% 61.7% 62.1% 62.9%
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Table 2.14: Welfare Gain/Loss Relative To Benchmakr U.S. Case
Countries Canada UK Germany France
Ex-ante ALL households +0.0008% +0.009% +0.024% +0.054%
Households with ability ρ1 + 0.0009% +0.0021% +0.083% +0.161%
Households with ability ρ2 +0.0009% +0.0021% +0.083% +0.161%
Households with ability ρ3 + 0.0009% +0.0021% +0.083% +0.161%
Households with ability ρ4 -0.0002% -0.062% -0.172% -0.328%
Households with ability ρ5 -0.03% -2.14% -3.653% -6.259%
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Figure 2.1: Timing
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Chapter 3
Small Business Loan Guarantees
as Insurance Against Aggregate
Risks
3.1 Introduction
Small businesses1 are commonly viewed as an important source of job creation
and the engine of economic growth. Based on the belief that they face dis-
proportional difficulties in accessing debt financing due to financial market
inefficiencies, small business loan guarantee programs have become a major
component of entrepreneurship policies in North America.2 Currently, the pop-
ular Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) 7(a) and 504(a) programs provide
guarantees for around $76 billion in loans in the U.S., and the Canadian Small
1Both US and Canada defines small business as ones that has fewer than 100 employees
(less than 50 if it is service based in Canada), and a medium-sized business as ones that with
fewer than 500 employees.
2Most developed countries have some kind of business loan guarantee programs in place,
with some of them operated by the government directly and others provided by trade unions.
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Business Financing Program (CSBFP) backs close to $1 billion in new loans
every year.
Despite the popularity of these programs, many skeptics question the effec-
tiveness and rationale behind these programs. Much of the attention has been
put on the “no-subsidy” policy of the SBA’s guarantee programs: throughout its
tenure, the George W. Bush administration required that the SBA’s guarantee
programs run at a zero subsidy rate (Mercer, 2006).3 Indeed, since 2005, the
popular 7(a) and 504(a) programs met the “zero subsidy” requirement until the
economy took a downturn in 2008.45 Understandably, the policy has generated
strong criticism from the public since its inception:
For an Administration that likes to trumpet the “ownership” society,
it’s a bit perplexing: President Bush wants to eliminate the federal
subsidies that support the nation’s smallest business. -CFO Maga-
zine
In fact, throughout the 1990s, even without the “zero subsidy” policy in place,
the SBA programs generated profits for the government, which sparked strong
criticism because it simply “puts money in bank for U.S.” (Crenshaw, 2001). The
3These subsidy rates are calculated without the inclusion of the agency’s administrative
costs . However, the SBA has many other functions in promoting SMEs. Less than 15% of the
agency’s budget goes into the administration of credit programs, and an even lesser amount
goes into guarantee programs.
4They actually maintained a negative estimated subsidy rate, i.e, they were making a profit;
for details see Figure 1 (SBA, 2010).
5Even for fiscal year 2009, when U.S. suffered a severer recession, the estimated program
subsidy is still less than 6% of the loans it guarantees, despite an increase of 10 fold from
previous year. In fact, the low default rates of these guaranteed loans in the U.S. have attracted
many research interests (Andradey and Lucas, 2009).
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public certainly has good reason for questioning it: most studies of the small
business guarantee program view it as a reallocation of resources from one set
of agents to another in the economy to address financial market inefficiency
caused by information asymmetry or moral hazards; without subsidies, it sim-
ply cannot improve the small businesses sector, since the government does not
have an information or technology advantage over private agents (Williamson,
1994; Li, 1998). As noted by Vogel and Adams (1997), Honohan (2009) and
Zecchini and Ventura (2009), the design of guarantee programs even with sub-
sidies, in general does not address these commonly cited market imperfections.
This chapter, in clear contrast, argues that if the government has an advan-
tage in providing aggregate insurance compared to financial institutions, then
a guarantee program with zero subsidy can significantly improve the efficiency
of the economy. It is widely accepted that financial institutions’ cost of borrow-
ing goes up during economic downturns compared to government, so it is dif-
ficult for them to rollover losses into future periods.6 Thus, ex-ante, they may
restrict their exposure to these risks by rationing loans. A stable government,
on the other hand, enjoys a relatively lower borrowing cost because of its lower
risk of default and monopoly rights to future tax revenues. In other words, the
government could smooth its spending across periods more easily. In this case,
6Two forces might drive up the cost of borrowing for financial institutions: first, the sup-
ply of deposits goes down during a recession; second, the institutions have to pay a higher
risk premium on their borrowing, since the risk of default goes up. Evidently, the spread of
corporate bonds in the financial sector goes up during economic down-turns (Barth, Li, and
Phumiwasana, 2009). Furthermore, the risk premium would be higher if they increased their
exposure to aggregate risks ex-ante.
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the government can offer insurance against aggregate uncertainty in the form
of loan guarantees by charging a fee (really a premium in this case). The pro-
gram could improve the efficiency of the economy by lowering borrowing costs
for firms that are financially constrained due to aggregate uncertainty.
To demonstrate this, I start with a standard two-period production economy
model with financial friction of costly state verification motivated by Townsend
(1979) and Li (1998), then incorporate a simple notion of aggregate uncertainty
(in the form of productivity shocks) into the model. Heterogeneous agents in
the economy are endowed with different levels of wealth and quality of projects,
and they make consumption, occupational, saving/borrowing, and investment
decisions. I first show that the introduction of aggregate uncertainty leads to a
lower level of entrepreneurship and that some firms are even more financially
constrained compared to the already inefficient economy with just costly state
verification. I then prove that if the administrative cost of running guarantee
program is zero (or very low) and the government could charge fees depending
on project quality, then there exists a guarantee program with a net present
value of zero that leads to the exact (or very close to the exact) allocation of the
economy without aggregate uncertainty.
However, it might be too costly for the government to charge different fees
to different firms. Thus, in reality, guarantee fees are usually fixed for cer-
tain range of guarantees. I show that within this framework, a guarantee
program with a fixed fee leads to an adverse-selection problem, and benefits
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low-quality firms more than high-quality firms. In particular, under the pro-
gram, relatively high-quality firms under-invest and apply for only minimum
necessary guarantees; while relatively low-quality firms over-invest and apply
for the maximum level of guarantees. Further more, it encourages low-quality
projects that are not financially constrained due to aggregate uncertainty to
participate in the guarantee program as well. In other words, it creates the
“over-lending” problem and could potentially lead the economy to a less effi-
cient state.7 To ease the adverse-selection problem, certain controls have to be
put into place, i.e, only projects with quality above a certain threshold should
be allowed into the guarantee program. However, direct selection of projects is
often difficult. Thus, the controversial high fixed cost of applying for guarantee
and the strict selection process can be viewed as mechanisms for overcoming
the adverse-selection problem by screening out low-quality projects. In addi-
tion, I show that in this environment, as long as the guarantee program meets
the “zero-subsidy” requirement, it leads to a more efficient allocation of re-
sources. However, the “zero-subsidy” requirement cannot completely overcome
the adverse-selection problem; even in that situation, the high-quality firms
under the program are subsidizing those of low-quality.
The model here is built on that of Li’s (1998), in which she studied a frame-
work with financial frictions caused by private information and moral hazard,
7The now-famous paper of Meza (2002) draws a similar conclusion: subsidy programs might
lead to over-lending in the aggregate economy and reduces overall economy efficiency due to
information asymmetry.
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and the friction drives a wedge between internal and external funds and in-
duces borrowing constraints just as in Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hell-
wig (1985). Li (1998) finds that direct grants are the best way to promote en-
trepreneurship and that guarantee programs attract risker projects with few
assets. She 2002 drew a similar conclusion in another paper in a dynamic and
general equilibrium framework. The other strand of literature on financial
frictions focuses on adverse-selection, in which borrowers have hidden knowl-
edge about their likelihood of repayment. Williamson (1994) studies the effect
of federal credit programs in both environments (costly state verification and
costly screening) and finds that these programs do not improve the efficiency
of allocation when the government is assumed not enjoy any informational
advantage. Innes (1991) finds that the government can often increase social
welfare by offering subsidized debt contracts; but guarantee programs lead to
constrained inefficiencies. Meza (2002) suggests that government-subsidized
guarantee programs lead to more lending to business than what is socially op-
timal due to adverse selection, much like the finding of this chapter about fixed
guarantee fees. Of course, most of these previous studies focus on the interac-
tion between financial friction and idiosyncratic risks and do not see insurance
against aggregate uncertainty as rationale for government intervention.
There have been many empirical studies that have tried to determine the ef-
fectiveness of these guarantee programs. Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2007)
find that SBA guaranteed lending has a small positive influence on the rate
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of economic growth in local markets, and they also find a positive correlation
between the average annual level of employment and the level of SBA guar-
anteed lending in local market in a later work Craig, Jackson, and Thomson
(2008), especially for low income markets. Riding and Haines (2001) first illus-
trate variations in guarantee programs in the U.S., Canada and the UK, and
then present a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the Canadian Small Business
Loans Act (CSBFP’s predecessor) program. The study finds that it is an effi-
cient way of job creation, but questions whether government’s intervention in
the credit market is warranted. Measuring additionality has always been dif-
ficult in these kind of studies, as noted by Honohan (2009) and Riding, Madill,
and Haines (2007).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
description of loan guarantee programs in the U.S. and Canada. Section 3
describes the baseline model. Section 4 analyze the guarantee program with a
fixed fee and provides policy discussion. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Loan Guarantee Programs in U.S. and Canada
A common loan guarantee covers part of a financial institution’s losses in the
event of a default, thus reducing the lending risk. In general, the program is
open to small businesses that would otherwise not qualify for a conventional
loan, because of that, borrowers are required to submit proofs of ineligibility
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for bank loans. Typically, guarantors set fees in an attempt to recover costs of
honoring defaults.
The eligibility for these guarantee programs usually contain three key cri-
teria:
The business has to be small: this is evaluated either on the number of em-
ployees or the revenue/sales size;
Sound repayment prospects: careful evaluations from the financial institu-
tion and possibly from the guarantee providing agencies are performed;
there are strict collateral requirements and pledge of personal guarantee
are usually mandatory;
Incrementality: lenders and borrowers have to demonstrate ineligibility of
loans under similar terms without the guarantee.
These programs usually require a lot of effort in preparation, such as a large
amount of paper work from both borrowers and lenders. In addition, these
programs require packaging fee ranging from $250-$2000, plus other upfront
costs like attorney and other kinds of professional fees of up to $5000 (Green,
2005). More details about the SBA and CSBFP guarantee programs follow.
In the U.S., the SBA was created under Public Law 163 in 1953 to make
direct loans, loans partnered with financial institutions, and to provide loan
guarantees. Later on, the SBA shifted the majority of its credit programs to
providing guarantees. The popular 7(a) and 504(a) program has expanded
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drastically over the last three decades: from backing 16,800 loans valued at
about $2.8b in 1986 (Rhyne, 1988), to 54,756 guaranteed loans were made in
2009, valued at $16.9b. Historically, a borrower seeking a loan applies to the
SBA for a guarantee through a financial institution that participates in the
program. To be deemed as eligible, the lender must prove that the business
could not obtain loans under the same terms without the guarantee and the
prospect of repayment is good. Originally, SBA staff reviewed each application.
If approved, a guarantee of up to 85% of loans up to $150,000 and a guaran-
tee of up to 75% for loans higher than $150,000 could be advanced. Loans are
secured to the extent that tangible assets were available and personal guar-
antee are required.8 However, the SBA has moved away from approval of all
loan applications, and moved towards more responsibility to the lending in-
stitution. More recently, after the spike in default rate in the 80’s (Mandel,
1992; Rhyne, 1988), the agency has concentrated lending with the more effi-
cient and responsible lenders and also encouraged other lenders to emulate
their examples (Riding and Haines, 2001). These efforts have resulted in in-
creased efficiency and a reduced rate of defaults. As noted before, during the
most of the 1990’s, these programs had generated profits for the agency un-
til the downturn in early 2000. Currently, there are three levels of guarantee
fee (paid at closing) for the 7(a) program: 2% of guaranteed portion for Up to
$150,000 guarantees, 3% of guaranteed portion for between $150,000-$700,000
8Even if these loans are secured, the value of collateralized assets in general decreases
during a economic downturn. Which means that financial institutions will ration loans due to
aggregate uncertainty without third party guarantee.
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of guarantees and 3.5% of guaranteed portion for Over $700,000. In addition,
a 0.55% fee on the guaranteed portion is charged annually. Borrowers under
the 504(a) are charged a lower fee of 2.5% on the guaranteed portion because
these loans are quite safer since only acquisition of fixed assets are eligible.9
In Canada, the SBLA (Small Business Lending Act) has provided guarantee
for small business loans through approved lenders since its inception in 1961
(Riding and Haines, 2001). The program was then replaced by the current
Canada Small Business Financing Program (CSBFP) in 1999. In general, bor-
rowers apply for loans from approved lending institutions to obtain guaranteed
loans. Unlike the SBA programs, the financial institution have full discretion
over loan making decision, and the Canadian government takes a passive role
in this case. Industry Canada is responsible primarily for maintaining regis-
tration of the loans and honoring the guarantee in case of default. However,
the 1999 reform of the program requires the ministry to put more attention
on cost recovery. Right now, the borrower pays a 2% registration fee and an
additional annual fee of 1.25% to the guarantor.
3.3 Model
I extend the baseline model of Li (1998) to include aggregate risk. Consider
a two periods economy populated by a continuum of agents of measure one.
9These fixed assets, being machinery or real estate, must be used as collateral.
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Agents’ preference over consumption is represented by U(c1) + c2, where ci, i ∈
{1, 2} denotes the consumption in period i. Standard assumptions on U(·) ap-
ply here, such that U(·)′ > 0, U ′′(·) < 0. Each agent is endowed with some
internal wealth ω and a project which they can choose to operate in the second
period. The distribution of wealth is represented by the cumulative distribu-
tion function Φ(ω) on interval [ω, ω¯], where 0 < ω < ω¯. Projects are indexed by
their probability of success p,10 the distribution of p is represented by the cu-
mulative distribution function Γ(p). In particular, a success project yields θf(k)
and a failed one returns nothing, where θ is the aggregate productivity and k
is the total investment. f(k) is assumed to be both increasing and concave in
k. For simplicity, I assume that there are only two aggregate states: a “good”
state occurs with probability γ where the aggregate productivity parameter is
θh and a “bad” state where the aggregate productivity parameter is θl, where
θh > θl. Furthermore, the aggregate state is only realized when project returns
are realized. It is connivent to denote the unconditional expected aggregate
productivity as θ¯ = γθh + (1− γ)θl.
In period 1, given the endowment of wealth s and a project p, an agent
makes a consumption-saving decision and an occupational decision. In partic-
ular, the agent chooses consumption in this period c1 , saving for the second
period s and whether to pursue entrepreneurship with the project. In period
10This represents the quality of the projects. Once can view this as the sum of probabilities
of all states that the firm has enough to repay their debt; even incase that collateralized assets
are liquidized. In that situation, the more fixed assets a firm has, then the higher is the quality
of the firm.
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2, an entrepreneur decides how much to invest k and how much to borrow (if
her saving is not enough to finance the project). A worker, on the other hand,
receives his income from lending and a fixed wage payment of q.
The only private information in this economy is the outcome of the projects,
which is revealed to the entrepreneur; all other information is public, like the
level of wealth, the quality of projects and the aggregate productivity. Follow-
ing Townsend (1979), an outsider could learn the project’s outcome by paying
an verification cost; this gives a role for a large financial intermediary who
takes deposits from a large number of agents and lends to a large number of
entrepreneurs, due to its ability to economize on verification costs. However,
random verification strategies are ruled out for simplicity. Following Li (1998),
this verification cost takes the form of β + ηb, where b denotes borrowing, β is a
fix cost and η is a per-unit cost on verification.
Loans take the form of one-period bond contracts. The face value of these
bonds is denoted by x, which is the amount that is to be repaid at the end
of second period. The market for bonds is perfectly competitive. While these
loans are non-contingent as the face value does not depend on the realization
of any value, entrepreneurs will default once their projects fail, in which case
the verification takes place. I assume that the intermediary can not take on
any aggregate risk, such that no one can provide insurance against aggregate
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shock except the government.11 Thus, in equilibrium the financial intermedi-
ary is perfectly diversified with respect to idiosyncratic project risks, earns zero
profits, and will have a nonstochastic return on its portfolio.
Suppose that the rate of return on deposits that the financial intermediary
pays to investors is r, then it follows that the intermediary is willing to offer a
loan to an entrepreneur if the expected return is also r, assuming there are no
transaction costs. Then, a loan contract with an entrepreneur that has project
p, saving s and capital size k has to satisfy the following:
px = r(k − s) + (1− p)[β + η(k − s)] (3.1)
The loan also has to satisfy a set of feasibility constraints for the entrepreneur,
such that she has at least enough to pay back the loan if her project successes,
regardless of the aggregate state:12
x ≤ θhf(k) (3.2)
x ≤ θlf(k) (3.3)
11i.e., if this is a dynamic model, I assume that the cost of capital for financial institution
during a downturn is infinity for simplicity. Discussion about a more general formulation is
provided in foot note 11.
12A more general way of modeling the situation is to explicitly state the cost of covering for
losses during a downturn, say it costs the financial institution (1 + ¯) for every unit of loss that
it incurs during a downturn. And the same loss costs the government (1 + ). Here,  can be
view as the borrowing cost for rolling over losses to the next period in a dynamic model. Then,
the zero profit condition (3.1) becomes:
px− (1− γ)(1 + ) min{0, x− θlf(k)} = r(k − s) + (1− p)[β + η(k − s)]
and constraint (3.3) is omitted. As long as there is a wedge between ¯ and , such that the
borrowing cost is lower for the government, most of the main results persist.
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Given the assumption that θl < θh, (3.2) can be omitted. The introduc-
tion of the state dependent feasibility constraint (3.3), which clearly induces
a borrowing constraint, is the main difference between this model and Li’s
(1998). In particular, for a low enough θl, the constraint (3.3) binds for some
entrepreneurs with low initial wealth and good quality projects: the low re-
turn of projects at this “bad” state limits entrepreneurs’ ability to invest at the
efficient scale, even if it rarely occurs. The inability of the financial interme-
diary to self-insure against this newly introduced aggregate uncertainty begs
the role for a third party that can offer such insurance. I am not implying that
banks in reality cannot smooth across states, I make such extreme assump-
tion just to illustrate that there is a large wedge between the borrowing cost
of financial institutions and the government during a downturn. Such that,
the government enjoy advantage in smoothing across states (across time in a
dynamic framework) compared to financial institutions.
An entrepreneur requires external financing with saving s and project p
solves the following maximization problem by choosing k:
ve(s, p) = max
k
θ¯pf(k)− δpx+ (1− δ)r(s− k) (3.4)
subject to:
x ≤ θlf(k)
px = r(k − s) + (1− p)[β + η(k − s)]
δ =
 1 if k > s;0 otherwise.
76
where θ¯ = γθh + (1− γ)θl is again the unconditional expected aggregate produc-
tivity.
The second period consumption of a representative worker with saving s is
consisting of the labour income q and a gross risk-less return on saving s:
vw(s) = q + rs (3.5)
Thus a representative agent with wealth ω and project p in period 1 chooses
his/her first period consumption c1, saving s, his/her occupation and investment
level k. Such that he/she solves the following problem:
max
c1,s,e
U(c1) + Ec2 (3.6)
subject to:
c1 + s = w, (3.7)
c2 = e× ve(s, p) + (1− e)× vw(s), (3.8)
e ∈ {1, 0}. (3.9)
Condition (3.7) states that the sum of an agent’s consumption in period 1 and
saving cannot exceed his asset endowment. Condition (3.8) says that an agent’s
second period expected consumption depends on his/her occupation, an en-
trepreneur has ve(s, p) and a worker has vw(s). Condition (3.9) restricts the
occupation indicator e to be binary: it takes the value of 1 if the agent chooses
to be an entrepreneur and 0 when he chooses to be an worker.
Given the above problem, the level of saving is pinned down by the following
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first-order condition:
U(w − s)′ =

∂ve(s,p)
∂s
, if e = 1;
r, if e = 0.
The left side is the marginal loss of utility from an additional unit of saving
and the right side is the marginal benefit from saving (either marginal return
from lending to the intermediary or the marginal product from the additional
capital).
Equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2. Given initial endowment distribution of wealth Φ(ω) and projects
Γ(p), verification cost of β and η, an equilibrium is a set of allocation of con-
sumption profile {c1, c2} saving s, occupation decision e and capital k for each
pair of w,p such that
1. given the interest rate r and initial endowment of (ω, p), each agent chooses
consumption profile {c1, c2}, saving s, occupation e and capital k, to maxi-
mize his/her utility subject to his/her constraints;
2. given the interest rate r, all loan contract satisfies condition (1) and (3);
3. capital market clears:∫
ω
∫
p
[k(ω, p)− s(ω, p)]δ(ω, p)dΦ(ω)dΓ(p) =
∫
ω
∫
p
s(ω, p)[1− δ(ω, p)]dΦ(ω)dΓ(p)
The left side is the aggregate demand of credit from all entrepreneurs, made
up of all borrowing from external financed entrepreneurs and savings from
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internally funded entrepreneurs. The right side is the total supply of credit
which is simply the sum of savings from all workers.
3.3.1 The case of second best without aggregate uncer-
tainty
Note that the first best allocation can only be achieved when there is no in-
formation asymmetry. As discussed by Li (1998), in that case, direct lending
performs as well as intermediation. In particular, the occupational decision is
determined solely by the quality of projects and is independent of an agent’s
level of wealth endowment.
Once the there is information asymmetry, then inefficiency comes as wealth
endowment enters the occupational decision: some relatively low quality projects
get carried out by richer owners; on the other hand, some agents cannot under-
take their high quality projects due to insufficient internal wealth. To see this,
let us first look at the solution to an agent’s problem when there is no aggre-
gate uncertainty and that θ¯ is high enough such that constraint x ≤ θ¯f(k) does
not bind.13 A borrowing entrepreneur equates the marginal product of capital
to the marginal cost of funds such that: θ¯pfk(k) = r + (1− p)η; a self- financing
entrepreneur equate the marginal product of capital to the return from addi-
tional saving such that: θ¯pfk(k) = r. Thus any additional wealth would raise
her utility first at rate r + (1 − p)η by reducing future borrowing needs (when
13In this case, the entrepreneur’s problem is the same problem as in (4), minus the x ≤ θlf(k).
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k > s), then at rate θ¯pfk(k) (whenever θ¯pfk(k) > r + (1 − p)η ) and then at rate
r through increased saving (when k ≤ s). For a worker, any additional wealth
would increase his utility by r through additional saving, which is less than
r + (1 − p)η. That is, for relatively low level of wealth, additional bit of wealth
raises an entrepreneur’s utility more than that of a worker’s; for higher level
of wealth, additional wealth raises their utility at the same rate. Thus, given a
good enough project,14 an agent’s occupational decision follows a simple cut-off
rule:
Result 1. Given a high enough p, there exist a cut-off level of wealth ωˆp such
that agents with wealth ω < ωˆp choose to be workers and agents with wealth
ω ≥ ωˆp choose to be entrepreneurs.
It is obvious that a better project would increase an entrepreneur’s utility
since vep(s, p) > 0. The worker’s utility, on the other hand, does not change with
the quality of the projects. The occupational decision then follows a simple
cut-off rule regarding project quality for a given wealth endowment:
Result 2. Given w, there exist a cut-off level of pˆω such that agents with project
p < pˆω choose to be workers and agents with project p ≥ pˆω choose to be en-
trepreneurs.
If an agent chooses to be an entrepreneur and requires external financing,
14It is possible for a project to have a low enough quality such that an agent never choose to
operate it regardless of his wealth endowment.
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the optimal choice of firm capital size k∗ is pinned down by the following condi-
tion:
pθ¯f(k∗) = r + (1− p)η (3.10)
Such that the marginal return on capital is equal to the marginal cost from
obtaining external funding. For those self-financed entrepreneurs who does not
carry additional savings, the optimal level of capital is pinned by the condition
that U ′(ω − s) = pθ¯f(k∗). The rest of entrepreneurs invest at efficient scale:
pθ¯f(k∗) = r.
3.3.2 The case with aggregate uncertainty
The introduction of aggregate uncertainty makes starting a business even more
difficult for poorer households. Note that as the financial intermediary cannot
take on any aggregate risk, the condition x ≤ θlf(k) induces a natural credit
constraint for each household. In the second period, given a pair of saving and
project (s, p), there is a limit on the maximum amount of capital that can be
raised from both internal and external sources combined: this limits on capital
(firm size), denoted by k¯s,p, can be pinned down by the equation x = θlf(k) while
holding the zero-profit condition (1), such that:
pθlf(k¯s,p) = r(k¯s,p − s) + (1− p)[β + η(k¯s,p − s)] (3.11)
Thus, given project p, a richer agent (with higher ω) has a larger range
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of capital to choose from than a relatively poorer agent.15 Thus, if ω is low
enough, some poor households endowed with good quality projects are going
to be excluded from entrepreneurship or cannot invest in efficient scale due to
the lack of internal resources. In the case when an entrepreneur is constrained,
she runs a firm with size equal to k¯s,p < k∗, and the marginal return on capital
is higher than r + (1 − p)η. When compared to the second best case, there are
less entrepreneurs, and some of those remaining entrepreneurs run smaller
firms, the aggregate output is obviously lower.16
3.3.3 Government operated loan guarantees
In this section, I show that in the presence of aggregate uncertainty, there
exists a government operated guarantees scheme that has a Net Present Value
of zero that leads to higher aggregate output. The same program cannot lead
to output improvement in the absence of such risks.
The government loan guarantee program will be operated through the fi-
nancial intermediary, since the government cannot economize on verification
cost.17 This program guarantees φ proportion of each private loans for a tar-
geted group. The targeted group in this case will be those who are credit
constrained due to the existence of aggregate risk, i.e firms with θ¯pfk(k) >
15A formal proof is provided in Appendix A to show that k¯s,p is decreasing in s.
16Fewer entrepreneur and higher fraction of smaller firms lead to reduction in demand for
credit in the economy, so equilibrium interest rate has to fall. A falling interest rate encourages
more agents to undertake entrepreneurship, and entrepreneurs operate larger firms. But this
second order effect is going to be dominated by the direct effect.
17Unless itself became the sole provider for all loans in the economy.
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r + (1 − p)η when there is no guarantee program. In order to recover the costs
of honoring defaults, the government charges a proportional fee τ on the guar-
anteed portion φx.
Under this loan guarantee program, the zero profit condition on a loan for
the financial intermediary is given by:
γ[px+ (1− p)φx] + (1− γ)(φx+ pθlf(k))
= r(k − s) + (1− p)[β + η(k − s)] (3.12)
x ≤ θlf(k) + φx (3.13)
where px+ (1− p)φx is the expected recovery amount under normal aggregate
condition, and φx + pθlf(k) is for under aggregate downturn. One of the key
assumption I am making here is that the government could costlessly smooth
across different states, this follows from the assumptions that it enjoys a lower
borrowing cost in the bad “state”.18 The guarantee fee does not show up here
because I assume that it is paid directly by entrepreneurs; I could assume it
is paid through the intermediary without having any impact on model results,
since the intermediary makes zero profit on each loan.
As for the government program, let’s first assume that the government can
charge individual entrepreneurs at different rate τ . Such that the requirement
of NPV = 0 is satisfied when the expected outlay and income of the program
18Again, this point would be much clear in a dynamic model, however the goal of this paper
is to use the simplest framework to illustrate the intuition of a government operated guarantee
program as insurance against aggregate risks.
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cancel out each other for every single loan:
(1− p)φx+ (1− γ)pφx = φxτ (3.14)
The left side is the expected payments to the financial intermediary in honoring
defaults when projects fail or in the event of aggregate downturn, and the right
side is the total fee collected. The above condition can be reduced to:
τ = 1− pγ (3.15)
This condition implies that the fee charged should be decreasing in the project
quality p, such that a better project should pay lower percentage guarantee
fees. The reason for this, is that the guarantee covers not only aggregate risk,
but also firm’s idiosyncratic risk.
Now, consider the expected profit for an entrepreneur who receives loan
guarantees:
ve(s, p) = max
k
θ¯pf(k)− [γpx+ (1− γ)θlf(k)]− τφx (3.16)
subject to:
γ[px+ (1− p)φx] + (1− γ)[φx+ pθlf(k)] = r(k − s) + (1− p)[β + η(k − s)]
x ≤ θlf(k) + φx
τ = 1− pγ
Where γpx+(1−γ)θlf(k) is the expected repayment to the bank, and τφx is the
guarantee fee paid to the government program. Substituting conditions (3.12)
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and (3.15) into the objective function, we have:
ve(s, p) = max
k
θ¯pf(k)− r(k − s)− (1− p)[β + η(k − s)] (3.17)
subject to:
x ≤ θlf(k) + φx
Clearly, the objective function is the same as in the case without aggregate
uncertainty, which means that the optimal level of capital is pinned down by
the same marginal conditions as before. Then, as long as government is able to
charge individual specific guarantee fees that depends on p, the program covers
only the aggregate risk but not idiosyncratic risks, such that entrepreneurs
have no incentive to apply for a higher level of guarantee than what is required.
The equilibrium allocation is the same as the situation without aggregate risk:
Result 3. If the government is able to charge individual specific guarantee fees,
then there exist a loan guarantee program with τ(p) = 1− γp and φ ∈ [0, 1] with
net-present-value of zero that leads to the same allocation as the case without
aggregate uncertainty.
In other words, the introduction of this particular guarantee program leads
to a more efficient allocation of resources.19 The competitive equilibrium is sim-
ilarly defined as before: it is a resource allocation of workers, entrepreneurs
19Note that this allocation is not Pareto superior to the equilibrium allocation without the
guarantee program. Because of the increase in demand for credit, equilibrium interest rate
goes up, thus those externally financed entrepreneurs not under the guarantee program pay a
higher interest rate and operate a smaller project.
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and interest rate, together with a guarantee fee schedule such that the fol-
lowing three conditions are satisfied: first, all agents optimize by choosing
consumption, saving, occupation, investment and whether to participate in
the guarantee program, subject to their constraints; second, the credit mar-
ket clears; third, the guarantee program has a net present value of zero, such
that:∫
ω
∫
p
(1− pγ)φ(ω, p, τ)x(ω, p, τ)dΦ(ω)dΓ(p) =
∫
ω
∫
p
τ˜φ(ω, p, τ)x(ω, p, τ)dΦ(ω)dΓ(p)
Where τ = 1− pγ
3.4 Guarantee program with a fixed guarantee
fee
It could be difficult for the government to charge different guarantee fees based
on project quality. For instance, the quality of project might not be directly
observable and it is costly to evaluate each individual project in detail and
assign a specific rate.20 Even if the financial institutions know more about the
quality of projects due to screening, they do not have incentive to share it with
the government. Thus, it might be convenient for the program to announce a
specific percentage guarantee fee τ˜ as in the Canadian case, and give a range
of φ ∈ [0, φ¯] that entrepreneurs can choose from. In that case, given τ˜ , an
20This is a more common case: the individual operating the firm and its associated financial
institution usually has more information about the quality of the firm than the government.
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entrepreneur’s expected profit is given by:
ve(s, p) = max
k,φ
θ¯pf(k)− [γpx+ (1− γ)θlf(k)]− τ˜φx (3.18)
subject to:
γ[px+ (1− p)φx] + (1− γ)[φx+ pθlf(k)] = r(k − s) + (1− p)[β + η(k − s)]
x ≤ θlf(k) + φx
φ ∈ [0, φ¯] (3.19)
Once we substitute the zero profit condition (3.12) into the objective function,
we have:
ve(s, p) = max
k,φ
θ¯pf(k)− r(k − s)− (1− p)[β + η(k − s)]
+(1− pγ − τ˜)r(k − s) + (1− p)[β + η(k − s)]− (1− γ)pθlf(k)γp
φ
+ (1− pγ)
From the above equation we can see that, if 1 − pγ > τ˜ , then the expected
profit is strictly increasing in φ and vice-versa. I denote the cut off project
quality as p˜τ , where 1− p˜τγ = τ˜ . That is, under the guarantee program, an en-
trepreneur with relatively low quality project (p < p˜τ ) chooses the highest pos-
sible guarantee level φ¯, and those with higher quality projects choose φ where
x = θlf(k) + φx. This is because, for an entrepreneur with project p < p˜z, her
guarantee payment τ˜φx is less than the expected payment from the guarantee
program to the bank, (1 − pγ)φx. Then, for any amount of loan x, a higher φ
leads to a higher expected profit for this entrepreneur, as the marginal cost of
obtaining higher φ is always lower than the marginal benefit. The same in-
tuition applies to entrepreneurs with p > p˜τ , but in the opposite direction. It
87
should be clear that in this case, the high-quality firms are subsidizing those
of low-quality ones. However, as government is the sole entity to provide insur-
ance against aggregate risks, for a low enough τ˜ it is still beneficial for some
relatively high quality projects to participate in the program.
The optimal level of capital (firm size) for an entrepreneur under the pro-
gram can be pinned down by the following first order condition with respect to
k:
θ¯pfk(k) + (1− pγ − τ˜)r + (1− p)η − (1− γ)pθlfk(k)γp
φ
+ (1− pγ) = r − (1− p)η (3.20)
It shows that the optimal level of k also depends on the sign of [1 − pγ − τ˜ ]. In
particular, given that r + (1 − p)η − (1 − γ)pθlfk(k) is positive, entrepreneurs
under the program with p > p˜τ chooses k∗ such that θ¯pfk(k) > r − (1 − p)η;
entrepreneurs under the same program with p < p˜τ invest at level where
θ¯pfk(k) < r − (1 − p)η. In other words, under this program with fixed τ˜ , when
compared to the case without aggregate uncertainty, entrepreneurs with rel-
atively lower quality projects over-invest and entrepreneurs with relatively
higher quality projects under-invest.
Result 4. Given a government guarantee program with fixed fee τ˜ and a guar-
antee range [0, φ¯], lower quality projects benefit more from it when compared to
higher quality ones. When compared to the case without aggregate uncertainty,
entrepreneurs with p < p˜τ choose φ¯ and over-invest their projects; entrepreneurs
with p > p˜τ choose φ = x−θlf(k)x and under-invest their projects.
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Just as any insurance policy with a fixed premium, there is a adverse-
selection problem associated with this guarantee program. This problem arises
for two reasons: first, when τ˜ increases, the benefit in participating in the pro-
gram decreases, some constrained entrepreneurs with high quality projects are
not going to participate in the program. Second, due to the asymmetry of ben-
efits from participation in the program between high and low quality projects,
all constrained entrepreneurs with project p < p˜τ will want to participate in
the program. In fact, if the program is open to anyone who wishes to obtain
a guarantee, some workers with relatively lower quality projects under the
case without aggregate uncertainty became entrepreneurs as well under this
guarantee program. Due to this adverse-selection problem and the asymme-
try between benefits obtained by high and low quality projects, the program
generates losses in the absence of additional qualification requirements. In
addition, the interest rate is higher as the demand for credit goes up, thus en-
trepreneurs not receiving a guarantee operate smaller firms when compared to
the case without aggregate uncertainty.
Result 5. A fixed fee loan guarantee program without additional qualification
constraints has to be financed by subsidy (i.e has a NPV < 0), and lead to an
“over-lending” problem due to adverse-selection.
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3.4.1 Policy Discussion
For any τ˜ , the government’s constraint NPV = 0 holds as long as21∫
ω
∫
p
(1− pγ)φ(ω, p, τ˜)x(ω, p, τ˜)dpdω =
∫
ω
∫
p
τ˜φ(ω, p, τ)x(ω, p, τ˜)dpdω (3.21)
It should be clear that if the guarantee program only allows projects above
certain quality threshold to participate in it, then the program could maintain
a NPV of zero or above. In fact, for any fixed fee τ˜ , there exists a unique
qualification level pτ˜ , such that if the program only allows projects with p >
pτ˜ to participate in the program, then the NPV of the program is zero. This
is easily done in theory, especially in an environment where p is observable.
Intuitively, to keep the NPV to be around zero, a higher guarantee fee would
result in a lower quality requirement and a lower guarantee fee would need a
higher quality requirement. However, a requirement of “zero subsidy” might
be a simple way to encourage the guarantor agencies to put more effort in
screening. That is, as long as the program has NPV = 0, we know that the
relatively high-quality projects benefit from the program or else they would
not participate.
A qualification requirement based on quality is easy to do in theory. How-
ever, in reality, it is sometimes hard for a lender and especially the guarantor
to learn the “true” quality of a project. There is a quite extensive literature on
credit rationing caused by entrepreneur’s hidden knowledge of project quality
21Here, for all entrepreneurs who are not credit constrained due to aggregate risk, choosing
to participate in the guarantee program lead to lower expected profit as they will be subsidizing
lower quality projects.
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as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In that case, the use of collateral and personal
guarantees as a self-selection and incentive mechanism can effectively mitigate
the problem (Chan and Thakor, 1987; Bester, 1987). Then the mandatory re-
quirement of collateral and personal guarantees by these guarantee programs
can be viewed as means to mitigate the adverse-selection problem by screening
out low-quality projects. In addition, the CSBFP and 504(a) program restricts
the use of loans for acquisition of fixed assets only, further strengthening the
prospects of repayments. As mentioned in section 2, starting from 1990, both
countries’ programs have paid more attention to cost recovery. For instance,
the SBA concentrated lending with the more efficient and responsible lenders,
which is a way of encouraging better screening among firms. Clearly this is
corresponding to the second criteria of sound prospects of repayment.
In the context of this model, the third selection criteria of incrementality can
be viewed as means to screen out those projects that are not constrained due to
the presence of aggregate uncertainty; i.e projets paying interest rate of r+(1−
p)η. However, note that given the opportunity to participate in the program,
these entrepreneurs would increase the amount of external financing; and in
fact, they would not qualify for the amount requested for the same rate under
the program. That is, technically, they would have met the incrementality
criteria. Thus, it has to be used in conjunction with the second criteria to be
effective.
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The third comment is around the controversial high upfront cost of obtain-
ing these loan guarantee, i.e, packaging fee from the guarantors themselves,
complex paperwork and other professional fees (Green, 2005). These costs
could be viewed as deadweight loss in the efficiency sense. However, the ex-
istence of these fixed cost could prevent entrepreneurs with low benefit from
the guarantee programs to participate in it. In particular, those entrepreneurs
with relatively low-quality projects and high wealth who are not credit con-
strained due to aggregate uncertainty. Thus, these upfront cost may in fact
lower the cost of these programs, then reduce the subsidy from high-quality
projects to low-quality entrepreneurs.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter shows that insurance against aggregate risk can be an important
rationale for small business loan guarantee programs. I demonstrate that in a
model, firms may be credit constrained because they are more prone to default
risks due to aggregate fluctuations and changes in financial institutions’ cost of
capital. The current loan-guarantee scheme promotes firm growth by providing
insurance and is socially beneficial in the presence of aggregate risks; the same
cannot be said in the absence of such risks. Furthermore, there is a potential
adverse-selection problem associated with the current guarantee fee structure.
However, strict selection process and high fixed cost of obtaining guarantees,
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in theory, could mitigate the problem and help maintain the low cost status of
these programs.
In this framework, I assume that financial intermediaries face higher cost of
covering for losses (high borrowing cost) during an economic downturn rather
than derive the cost endogenously. Obviously, it cannot be done in a static
model. An interesting extension is to study a dynamic version with the possi-
bility of default by a financial institution. Such that, the high borrowing cost
during economic downturn arise endogenously. Also, quantitative cost/benifit
evaluation of the guarantee program could be performed in such a framework.
Another possible extension is to study the effect of guarantee program un-
der aggregate uncertainty in an environment with the other kind of informa-
tion asymmetry mentioned in the literature; namely, when entrepreneurs have
hidden knowledge about the quality of their projects (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981;
Williamson, 1994). In particular, there is one more adverse-selection problem
with bank lending as well.
Even though the Bush adminstration required that guarantee programs to
be operated on a “zero-subsidy” status, at the awakening of the recent financial
crisis lead recession, these programs clearly did not have enough resources to
cover the increase in demand for honoring defaults. There are two potential
reasons for this: first, the guarantee program was under the new policy for too
short of a period, such that it did not build up enough resources to cover losses
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caused by such a drastic event; second, there is little experience on project de-
faults and the consequent losses due to aggregate uncertainty(Honohan, 2009),
to the extent that the lack of information makes designing the “correct” scheme
difficult; in particular, it is difficult to set the correct risk-premium. Needless
to say, this is an interesting topic for future research.
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Chapter 4
Financing High-Tech Start-Ups:
Equity Ownership Matters
4.1 Introduction
The importance of U.S. venture capitalists’ role in fostering innovative high-
tech firms over the past 30 years has been well documented. Apple Computers,
Cisco Systems, Google, Microsoft, SUN are just a few but the most famous U.S.
companies to get funding from venture capital (henceforth, VC) firms while
young. Consequently, there has been a dramatic expansion of public programs
that encourage the formation of VC funds across Europe around mid to late
1990s (Tejada, 2003; Baygan, 2003b,a; Baygan and Freudenberg, 2000). These
programs are all backed by one common rationale: VC has spurred technology
innovation in the U.S., and can do so elsewhere. However, despite European
governments’ efforts, we see that only a few of the European countries have
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comparable levels of VC investments in their high-tech sectors as the U.S. to-
day. (For details see Figure 4.3.)
Public policies that encourage high-tech investments are commonly ratio-
nalized by the belief that young high-tech firms face more difficulties in obtain-
ing external financing, especially debt financing. The most commonly docu-
mented reasons for these firms not be able to get external financing are the
following (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994).
First, the returns to high-tech investments are skewed and highly uncertain,
as R&D projects usually have a low probability of financial success. Second,
a high level of information asymmetry is likely to exist between firms and po-
tential investors, such that firm managers have much better information than
outsiders about the prospects of the firm’s investments. Third, high-tech in-
vestments often have limited collateral value, as R&D investments have little
value in the event of failure. These studies (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002;
Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994) claim that VC investment is better fitted for
high-tech industries for the following reasons. First, venture capitalists’ exper-
tise in monitoring and screening may help to solve the adverse selection and
information asymmetry problems. Second, by taking an equity position in the
venture firm, the VC firms can share proportionately in profit, guaranteeing
that VC firms benefit if the firm does well.
However, there is nothing preventing banks from doing the same type or
level of monitoring, at least from a legal stand point of view. Even if banks
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lack the necessary expertise in performing these tasks, “experts” can be hired
to do it, as long as it is profitable. In fact, most major commercial banks in
Canada have subsidiaries created for providing equity financing to young high-
tech firms (Groupe Secor Inc. 1998).1 Further more, banks do have the ability
to write contingent contracts such that the interest rates they charge are based
on a firm’s performance. In theory, this would allow them to share the upside
profit. So, what is so special about equity financing? The control rights come
with the partial ownerships.2 More specifically, voting rights, cash flow rights
and the ability to allocate and negotiate these rights contingent on portfolio
firm’s performances. It is well known that, as opposed to debt contracts, typi-
cal VC contracts specify detailed provisions on the allocation regarding control
rights (Bascha and Walz, 2001). Furthermore, VC investors usually hold dis-
proportional control over the firm. Even if the VC firm holds only a small
share of the common stock, it still maintained effective control over the board,
directly through reserved seats or through a disproportionate share of votes.
Also, in the case of asset sales or large expenditures, approval from venture
investors is required.
As argued by Gompers (2004), banks in the U.S. cannot undertake the same
type of deal that venture capitalists do, because regulations limit banks’ abil-
ity to hold shares in non-financial firms, and so they cannot freely do equity
1This is a special case within the four countries group of Denmark, Sweden, Canada and
U.S. In the other three countries, even the subsidiaries of commercial banks cannot offer equity
financing freely, at least not until early 2000.
2Mainly through the use of convertible securities by VC in the U.S.
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financing.3 It turns out these restrictive regulations only exist in a few of the
developed countries, namely Denmark, Sweden, Canada and the U.S., which
all have disproportionately high levels of VC investments concentrated in their
high-tech industries compared to other developed nations. (See Figure 4.3 for
details.)
To illustrate the importance of the ability to vary the level of control con-
tingent on performance by investors in the high-tech sector, I develop a simple
principal-agent model of start-up financing with information asymmetry, moral
hazard and R&D investments. In particular, the entrepreneur learns the true
“type” of the project after R&D investments are made while the investors only
get a signal, which a contract can formulate contingencies on. On top of that,
the entrepreneur can choose to deviate and “eat” investments in any period,
for a private benefit. The existence of this moral hazard problem makes it
harder to solve the information asymmetry problem by varying payoffs to the
entrepreneur and/or investment levels. This is because the private benefit from
deviating does not depend on the outlook of the project, but the actual invest-
ment level. One crucial assumption of this model is that the moral hazard
problem can be directly tackled by varying the level of control over the firm, as
is the case for a typical VC contract: when a portfolio firm is not performing
well, the VC firm monitors more intensively and gains more control over the
firm. I show that when these three commonly documented characteristics of
3After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act being signed to law in 1999, U.S. banks are permitted
to take equity in commercial firms through their merchant banking subsidiaries. Though long-
term control of commercial firms by banks is still restricted (Krainer, 2000)
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the high-tech firm coexist, namely: (i) a high degree of information asymmetry,
(ii) a high level of uncertainty about returns, and (iii) a large amount of R&D
investment preceding production, then the ability for lenders to vary the level
of control contingent on performance becomes key.
This result provides support for the view that ownership-equity type financ-
ing is better suited to fund young high-tech firms (though, not necessarily from
a VC firm). Thus, in countries where equity financing from commercial banks
is restricted, VC firms have a clear advantage in investing in the high-tech sec-
tor. Indeed, VC firms in the four countries mentioned above do invest heavily in
high-tech industries. However, one cannot simply conclude that countries with
fewer VC investments in high-tech have a smaller high-tech sector compared to
the U.S. The UK, for instance, has a fairly large pharmaceutical industry. Even
if the European policy makers insist that their high-tech industries do need ad-
ditional support, the lack of funding is certainly not the main challenge these
industries face. If it was profitable to invest in these industries, commercial
banks would have provided all the equity financing needed before VC firms
came along. Germany’s banks in particular are famous for getting involved in
the business decision making in firms they invest in (lend to); sometimes the
bank manager may sit on the board even when only debt financing is offered.
Thus, as VC firms no longer have an advantage in offering equity financing
in most European countries, they have to compete with commercial banks in
all sectors. In fact, the use of debt financing still dominates equity financing
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within the European VC industry, which suggests that these firms are more
like traditional banks compared to their North American counterparts. The
other evidence for this view is that the European private equity industry is
very concentrated in later stage financing, as VC investments by volume are
much less than those of the buy-out funds.
Many studies have tried to explain why VC is special. Ueda (2004) study
a model in which the venture capitalist has advantage in evaluating a project,
but can ”steal” it from an entrepreneur. We share the same prediction that
projects with higher returns, higher risk and lower collateral values are fi-
nanced through a venture capitalist. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) develop a
model of financial intermediaries that can monitor an entrepreneur’s effort,
and they show a similar result that entrepreneurs finance through equity if
they are short of collateral. Black and Gilson (1998), argues that the non-
financial services offered by venture capital loses its efficiency as portfolio com-
pany matures, such as monitoring, advisory services and reputational capital.
That’s why an active stock market is important for a successful venture capital
industry. This view is shared by Baygan and Freudenberg (2000) and oth-
ers. However, these papers’ results do not help explain the cross country dif-
ferences in sectoral allocation of venture capital investments. For instance,
several countries with less active stock markets have a comparable total and
per-capita level of venture capital investment as the United states, but all have
much lower levels of high-tech VC investments.
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There are several other papers that deal with allocation of control rights
in venture capital financing. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) argue that VC firms
use staging and convertible securities together as a solution to the conflict of
interest between the VC firms and the entrepreneur, much like in this chapter.
Berglo¨f (1994) claims that state-contingent allocation of control rights through
convertible securities allocates control to the party that has the higher outside
option. Bascha and Walz (2001) show that state-contingent control rights help
implement the first best decision regarding IPO’s. Schmidt (2003) argues that
usage of convertible debt can implement efficient effort levels from both the
VC and the entrepreneur. Unlike these papers, I show the importance of the
investor’s ability to vary level of control. I isolate this effect from the compli-
cated two-sided bargaining process between the entrepreneurs and investors
over payoffs or control rights, and the final IPO exit decisions. In particular, I
show that having controlling ownership becomes more important as the levels
of uncertainty about returns increases, and when information asymmetry and
moral hazard problems worsen.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the
facts about banking regulation and venture capital investments across coun-
tries; Section 3 describes the model; a characterization of the optimal contracts
offered by debt and equity investors is presented in Section 4; and Section 5
Concludes.
105
4.2 Banking Regulations and Venture Capital In-
vestments Across Countries
First, I present the regulations on commercial banks holding equities in non-
financial firms for a sample of 17 European and North American countries.
First, the restrictive ones: Denmark’s commercial banks may not hold perma-
nent, decisive participation in a non-financial firm; Canadian banks can hold at
most 10% of total share of a non-financial firm;4 Portugal’s bank can hold only
up to 25% of voting power in non-financial firms that they invest in; Sweden’s
bank can only hold up to 5%; and U.S. banks are not allowed to offer equity
financing, unless the firm in question is small and is in financial distress. Even
in that situation, banks are still prohibited to get involved with the business
decision making.
All other countries’ regulation in the sample follow closely the EC bank-
ing ACT II, which allows banks to take equity stakes in non-financial firms.
Among these countries, only two countries enforce extra restrictions: in the
Netherlands, banks are required to get permits from the government in or-
der to hold more than 25% of share in a non-financial firm; In UK, banks are
required to remove the equity holdings from their assets when reporting for
banking risk, if the holding is more than 15% of the firm’s outstanding share.
The statistics on VC investments are taken from publications by the U.S.
4As mentioned before, they are allowed to set up subsidiaries that provide equity financing.
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venture capital association (2006), Canadian venture capital association (2006)
and the European venture capital association (2006).5 Figure 4.1 shows the to-
tal flow of VC investments in 2004-2005 as fraction of GDPs for all sample
countries. Although U.S.’ VC industry is the oldest, other countries are catch-
ing up pretty fast, as Canada, Sweden and UK’s total investment levels as
share of GDP have already surpassed that of U.S’ with this measure (also on
a per-capita basis). Figure 4.2 presents that high-tech as fraction of total VC
investments levels for the same group of countries. Greece’s VC industry is
particular high in this category simply because Greek VC firms can only invest
in the high-tech sector, and as a result the total VC investment level is the
lowest among all these countries. Ireland’s number is high for a very similar
reason. It is clear that the fraction of VC investments went to the high-tech
sector is very low for the UK. Figure 4.3 reports the VC investments in high-
tech sector as fraction of GDPs for these countries. The group of four countries,
Canada, Denmark, Sweden and U.S. clearly stand out from the rest. Sweden’s
share, which is the lowest among these four countries, is still more than twice
as much that of Belgium’s, whose is the fifth highest among all sample coun-
tries. U.S. has almost four times as much.
After examining these statistics, it is safe to conclude that countries with
stricter restrictions on commercial banks holding controlling equity in non-
financial firms have disproportionate high levels of VC investments in their
5My own calculation is reported whenever necessary.
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high-tech sector, except Portugal. Which suggests that the VC firms in these
four countries enjoy certain advantages in investing in the high-tech sector. I
construct a simple model in the next section to help understand why equity
financing with ownership is more suitable for high-tech firms.
4.3 Model
A project involves a risk-neutral entrepreneur/manager with an idea, and a
risk-neutral investor, either a VC firm or a bank. The entrepreneur (manager)
does not have any wealth, thus she needs external financing to start a project.
Only the VC firm and bank can commit to contractual arrangements, though
they have all the bargaining power in designing the contract by assumption.
The project takes three periods to mature (an R&D period, a production pe-
riod and a final period). In the first period financial contract is signed then fol-
lowed by R&D investment. In the second period, the entrepreneur first decides
whether to leave the contract arrangement or not, then production investment
is made. In the final period investment returns are realized, and claims are
settled.
Each entrepreneur only has one project or idea. It costs a fixed amount of
investment I¯R&D to undertake the Research & Development in period 1. Pro-
duction investment I can be chosen from the interval [0, 1] in period 2, condi-
tional on I¯R&D was spent. In period 3 the investment generates a verifiable
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financial return equaling 0 (failure) or I × R (success). Each project is one of
two types, good or bad, which differs in probability of success.6
Project good bad
Probability of success ph pl
Probability of being type i η 1− η
I assume that
∆p = ph − pl > 0 (4.1)
and denote the unconditional probability of successes as pˆ = ηph + (1 − η)pl.
Furthermore, the rate of return on investment capital is assumed to be 0 for
simplicity, and only type good projects are economically viable:
Assumption 1. : phR− I¯R&Dη > 1 > plR
The reason that I¯R&D
η
is on the left-side instead of IR&D is because that there
is no way of separating the bad projects from the good ones in the first period.
Thus, IR&D is necessary for all projects, even if none of the bad projects continue
on past the second period. In other words, IR&D for bad projects is a part of
the necessary upfront cost for good projects, then for the good projects to be
economically viable, their return has to cover not only their share of the R&D
investments, but also the bad ones’.
6An alternative way of modeling this is to assume projects differ in rate of returns (i.e.
RH > RL) but have the same probability of success. Since all parties are risk-neutral, the
model’s qualitative predications do not change
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In the absence of proper incentives or monitoring, the entrepreneur may
“eat” the investment for a private benefit (after which the project will fail). The
private benefit from this action is equal to a share  of the investment I in that
period, where  ∈ (0, 1). On top of that, the entrepreneur also has an outside
option, where she can work somewhere else for a wage w˜ per period. I assume
that,
Assumption 2. : 2w˜ > × 1 > w˜
Such that the private benefit derived by deviating from a fully funded project
is higher than the payoff of working for one period, so the entrepreneur has in-
centive to continue a fully funded type bad project. On the other hand, it’s not
worthwhile to participate in the contract just for the sake of investment eating.
This hidden action need not solely represents the situation where the en-
trepreneur uses all resources for personal use. It is to capture two types of
agency costs commonly exist with entrepreneurial firms (Gompers and Lerner,
2004): first, entrepreneurs might want to invest in research or projects that
have high personal returns but not high monetary payoffs to their financiers.
Take the example of a biotechnology firm: the manager may choose to invest
in research that brings greater recognition in the scientific community but pro-
vides less financial returns. Second, the entrepreneur might possess private
information and choose to continue investing in a project with less expected
payoffs. For example, managers might learn the demand for a new product is
low, but want to keep the company going because they have private benefits
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from managing their own firms.
On top of the moral hazard problem described above, there is also infor-
mation asymmetry between the entrepreneur and her financier (like the sec-
ond case described above). At the time when a contract is signed, neither the
entrepreneur nor her financier knows the true type of the project. The en-
trepreneur learns her project’s true type at the second period, with certainty.
On the other hand, only a fraction λ projects’ true type is revealed to their fi-
nanciers. I will formulate the information obtained by investors in period 2 as
a signal, where θ is drawn from the set {H,M,L}, such that:
Prob{i = good|θ = H} = Prob{i = bad|θ = L} = 1
Prob{i = good|θ = M} = 1− Prob{i = bad|θ = M} = η
So, from the viewpoint of financiers, projects with signal H are of the good type,
those with signal L are of the bad type. They are not sure about the true type
for projects with signal M , but know that with probability η they are of the
good type. Timing of model is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
I assume that the main difference between the two kinds of financier is that
a venture capitalist as equity holder can eliminate the moral hazard problem
(investment eating) by monitor more intensely and place tighter control over
a firm at a fixed cost c, the bank as debt holder, on the other hand, cannot.
Suppose that an venture firm’s performance is in question, but not bad enough
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such that it needs to be terminated. In this situation, the probability that the
entrepreneur is going to use company resources for private benefits (both cases
discussed above) goes up, especially if the entrepreneur secretly knows that the
outlook of the firm is bad. To solve this problem, an VC firm could send someone
over to monitor the management more intensely. And more importantly, VC
firms are able to directly intervene with the management, and take away key
control rights if they deem it necessary. The debt investor, on the other hand,
could monitor the firm more intensely, but lack the ability to directly intervene.
They have to use other means to solve the problem: raise interest rates, and
lower or stop further funding.7
I will end this section with some interpretations of variations in key vari-
ables in the model:
• Decrease in λ (fraction of projects’ true type is known to its financiers)
represents increase in the degree of information asymmetry;
• Increase in level of uncertainty about returns can be achieved by increase
the speared of uncertainty ∆pwhile keeping the unconditional probability
of success pˆ fixed;
• Higher R&D investment is simply represented by higher IR&D;
• The moral hazard problem worsens as  increases.
7The other difference between the two, is the ability to request collateral. However, as
discussed before, high-tech investments in general have little collateral value.
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4.4 Optimal Contracts
In this section, I derive the optimal contracts that the bank and the VC firm
offers.8 It should be clear that these contacts are written in the way as a take
it or leave it offer to the entrepreneur.
4.4.1 Bank contract
A contract can be characterized by Ψ = {IM , IH , yM , yH} where yθ is the final
payoff to the entrepreneur upon project success and Iθ is the investment level
at the production period. These variables have subscripts denoting a partic-
ular signal, since the bank can alter investments and payoffs contingent on
signals. In principle, IR&D and{yL, IL} should also be specified in the contract,
but the formal cannot be chosen and the later are trivially set to {0, 0} (since
bad projects are not economically viable), thus they are omitted from the con-
tract specification.
Although a typical loan contract states interest rates rather than payoffs to
the borrower, there is a one-to-one mapping between the two in this model, ie:
rθ =
RIθ−yθ
IR&D+Iθ
. To denote the contract in this fashion makes it easier to compare
the bank contract to its counterpart offered by the VC firm.
Given model specification, there are only two types of contract that could be
the most profitable one for the bank depending on parameter values:
8Optimal with respect to the tools that each investor has in designing the contract
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1. Fund all projects with signalM andH fully, not screening out bad projects
with medium signal;
2. Fund only projects with signal H fully, but place a credit limit for projects
with signal M so that entrepreneurs with bad project leave.
I will call the first no credit rationing contract, and the second credit rationing
contract.
no credit rationing contract
The contracting problem where the bank fully funds all projects with signal M
and H without screening is the following:
max
IM∈[0,1],IH∈[0,1]
E0(pi)
subject to:
E0(y) ≥ 2w˜ (4.2)
E0(y) ≥ IR&D + w˜ (4.3)
E1(y|θ, i = G) ≥ w˜ ∀θ (4.4)
E1(y|θ, i = G) ≥ Iθ ∀θ (4.5)
E1(y|θ = M, i = B) ≥ IM (4.6)
(4.2) and (4.4) are just participation constraints; (4.3), (4.5) are (4.6) are the
incentive compatible constraints such that entrepreneurs who should continue
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to run projects do not “eat” the investments. This is a linear maximization
problem with only linear constraints. Here, either (4.2) or (4.3) binds with
equality depending on which of the following values is higher: {w˜, IR&D}. (4.6)
binds with equality, such that phyM = . The solution to the contract problem
is
Ψncr = {IncrM = 1, IncrH = 1, yncrM =

ph
, yncrH =
max{w˜, IR&D}+ (1− (1− η)λ)w˜ − (1− λ) ph pˆ
phηλ
}
Note that under this contract, all good projects get fully funded. Although,
there is a fraction (1 − λ) of bad projects also get fully funded, which generate
losses. All entrepreneurs with medium signals are paid less than those with
high signals in the third period if project success; in other words, they pay a
higher interest rate. The expected profits for the bank under this contract is:
pincr = η(phR−1)+(1−η)(1−λ)(plR−1)− IR&D− [1−λ(1−η)]w˜−max{w˜, IR&D}
The first term is the return from type good project, and the second term is
the loss from bad project, and the last two terms represent the payoff to the
expected entrepreneur.
credit rationing contract
The contract problem when a bank try to screen out bad projects with medium
signal is:
max
IM∈[0,1],IH∈[0,1]
E0(pi)
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subject to:
E0(y) ≥ 2w˜ (4.7)
E0(y) ≥ IR&D + w˜ (4.8)
E1(y|θ, i = G) ≥ w˜ ∀θ (4.9)
E1(y|θ, i = G) ≥ Iθ ∀θ (4.10)
E1(y|θ = M, i = B) ≤ w˜ (4.11)
IM ≤ w˜ (4.12)
(4.7),(4.8), (4.9) and (4.10) are the same as before. (4.11) and (4.12) are the in-
centive compatible constraints to make sure that entrepreneur with bad project
but medium signal does not stay or eat investment. Again, either (4.7) or
(4.8) holds with equality. (4.11) and (4.12) both bind, such that phyM = w˜ and
IM = w˜. The contract is simply:
Ψcr = {IcrM =
w˜

, IcrH = 1, y
cr
M =
w˜
ph
, ycrH =
max{w˜, IR&D}
phηλ
+
w˜(1− 1−λ
ph
)
phλ
}
Under this contract, none of the type bad project gets funded in the second
period, but fraction (1− λ) of the good projects only get partially funded. Obvi-
ously, their potentials are not fully captured. Expected profit from this contract
is:
picr = ηλ(phR− 1) + η(1− λ)w˜

(phR− 1)− IR&D − [1− (1− η)]w˜ −max{w˜, IR&D}
The first term is the return from project with signal H, the second term is the
return from type good project with signal M, and the last two terms represent
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the expected payoff to the entrepreneur The bank’s contract problem can be
simply summarized as:
piBank = max
Ψncr,Ψcr
{pincr, picr}
Proposition 1. The spread between expected profits of the credit rationing con-
tract and the non-credit rationing contract (picr − pincr) is:
1. increasing in the spread of uncertainty ∆p while holding pˆ constant;
2. decreasing(increasing) in λ when picr is higher(lower) than pincr .
Proof: See Appendix B.
In other words, the credit rationing contract is used by the bank when there
is a high degree of information asymmetry and the level of uncertainty about
return is high. Note that, even in this relatively simple setup, the tools em-
ployed by most commercial banks in solving the agency problem are featured:
varying interest rates and level of further lending contingent on firm perfor-
mance. Though, even with these tools at hand, banks either have to finance
some bad projects under the no credit rationing contract or the investment
level is inefficiently low for some good projects under the credit rationing con-
tract.
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4.4.2 Venture capital contract
By assumption, an VC firm can also alternate the investment level and the
payoff to the entrepreneur. Clearly, it can offer both contracts that the bank
offers. Thus, I will only derive the contract where the VC firm alters level of
control to eliminate the investment eating problem. Note that an VC firm only
places tighter control on a project with medium signal, not those with high
signals, since given assumption 2, we know that  < 2w˜. On top of that, if IR&D
is big enough, an VC firm places tighter control on all projects in the R&D
period as well. At first, I just specified the case where IR&D is not big enough
for the VC firm to start tightening control in the first period, which happens
when IR&D < w˜ + c
max
IM∈[0,1],IH∈[0,1]
E0(pi)
subject to:
E0(y) ≥ 2w˜ (4.13)
E0(y) ≥ IR&D + w˜ (4.14)
E1(y|θ, i = G) ≥ w˜ ∀θ (4.15)
E1(y|θ, i = G) ≥ Iθ ∀θ (4.16)
E1(y|θ = B, i = B) ≤ w˜ (4.17)
Again, (4.13) and (4.15) are the participation constraints, (4.14) (4.16) are
the incentive compatible constraints such that entrepreneurs who should con-
tinue to run projects do not “eat” the investment, and (4.17) is just to make
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entrepreneur with bad project and medium signal quit, note that this problem
has one constraint less than the bank’s credit-constraint contract problem, as
the investment eating problem has been taken care of by placing tighter control
over the firm for projects with medium signals.
Now, consider the case where R&D investment is big enough so that VC firm
will pace tighter control in the first period: the only change is that constraint
(4.14) is replaced by E0(y) ≥ 2w˜. The full solution to this contract problem is
characterized by:
Ψvc = {IM = 1, IH = 1, yM = w˜
ph
, yH =
Λ− (1− η)w˜ − (1− λ)η w˜
pl
phηλ
}
where
Λ =
 w˜, if w˜ ≥ IR&D or IR&D < w˜ + c;IR&D, otherwise;
Expected profit from this contract is:
piV C = η(phR− 1)− IR&D − (1− λ)c− [1− (1− η)]w˜ −min{c,max{IR&D, w˜}}
Here, as the VC firm is able to screen out all bad projects for a fixed cost
c, they are able to fund all type good projects at the efficient size of 1. Note
that, this solution features the characteristic of a typical VC contract: when
a portfolio firm does well, the manager gets better payoff and retains more
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control rights; if it is not doing so well, the manager gets lower payoff and
retains fewer control rights; if the firm is doing really bad, no further funding
is provided.
Proposition 2. The spread between expected profits of the VC contract and the
bank contract (piV C − piBank) is:
1. decreasing in λ when c is relatively small;
2. increasing in the spread of uncertainty ∆p while keeping pˆ constant;
3. increasing in IR&D;
4. increasing in .
Proof: See Appendix C.
Clearly, when these three characteristics of the high-tech industry coexist,
the equity contract is better fitted. Mainly due to the interaction between the
information asymmetry and the moral hazard problem, such that the private
benefit from this hidden action only depends on the investment level, but not
on the prospect of the project itself, which makes it harder to solve the agency
problem by simply varying payoff and/or interest rates.
The above proposition shows that the ability for the principal to retain con-
trol rights is important for financing young high-tech firms. Thus, the model
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predict that in countries where equity financing from commercial banks is re-
stricted, VC firms would have advantage in investing in that sector. In coun-
tries where such restriction is not in place, VC firms lose this advantage. Thus,
VC investments should be more concentrated in high-tech sector where these
restriction exists. Indeed, this prediction is consistent with the empirical facts
presented in section 2.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter assesses the importance of controlling ownership in financing
young high-tech firms. I build a simple principal agent model that will show
equity financing is better suited for projects with (i) a high degree of informa-
tion asymmetry, (ii) a high level of uncertainty about returns, and (iii) a large
amount of R&D investment preceding production. This result helps explain the
observed difference in sectoral allocation of VC investments across countries.
Such that in countries where commercial banks are allowed to offer equity fi-
nancing, VC investments do not concentrate in the high-tech sector, as they no
longer hold this advantage.
This result suggests two possible reasons for why most European govern-
ments’ efforts in attract investment in high-tech sector by encouraging VC in-
vestments have failed: first, commercial banks have already provided all the
investments needed by the high-tech sector, the addition of VC was not needed;
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second, the profitability of high-tech firms in Europe is not high enough, such
that it is a problem of lack in demand rather than supply of financing. Clearly,
this issue deserves more careful investigation.
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Figure 4.1: Venture capital investments as fraction of GDP, 2004-2005
Figure 4.2: Fraction of venture capital investments goes into high-tech sector,
2004-2005
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Figure 4.3: Venture capital high-tech investments as fraction of GDP, 2004-
2005
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Figure 4.4: Timing
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis makes several contributions to the filed of entrepreneurial financ-
ing. Several cases of how government policies, whether intended to affect en-
trepreneurs or not, could have large impact on the entrepreneurial sector are
demonstrated here. In the first chapter, I show that variations in bankruptcy
regimes have little effect on high-ability households’ occupational choices, change
in the length (periods) of post-bankruptcy punishment appears to have the
largest impact on entrepreneurship, and asset exemption had only a modest
effect. When it comes to moderate-ability households’ occupational choices,
the insurance effect completely dominates the borrowing cost effect. This re-
sult suggests that a very lenient bankruptcy regime like the U.S. Chapter 7
system does encourage entrepreneurship, though it lowers the average pro-
ductivity in the entrepreneurial sector, but increases the overall production in
the economy. The results also help explain the U.S.’ higher turnover rate and
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lower average business size compared to other developed nations. The model
also suggests that entrepreneur households prefer more lenient bankruptcy
regimes and worker households prefer less lenient regimes due to moderate
wage income risks.
The second chapter shows that insurance against aggregate risk can be an
important rationale for small business loan guarantee programs. Firms may
be credit constrained because they are more prone to default risks due to ag-
gregate fluctuations and changes in financial institutions’ cost of capital. The
current loan-guarantee scheme promotes firm growth by providing insurance
and is socially beneficial in the presence of aggregate risks; the same cannot be
said in the absence of such risks. Furthermore, I show that there is a potential
adverse-selection problem associated with the current guarantee fee structure.
However, strict selection process and high fixed cost of obtaining guarantees,
in theory, could mitigate the problem and help maintain the low cost of these
programs.
The thrid chapter assesses the importance of controlling ownership in fi-
nancing young high-tech firms. I build a simple principal agent model that
will show equity financing is better suited for projects with (i) a high degree of
information asymmetry, (ii) a high level of uncertainty about returns, and (iii)
a large amount of R&D investment preceding production. This result helps
explain the observed difference in sectoral allocation of VC investments across
countries. Such that in countries where commercial banks are allowed to offer
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equity financing, VC investments do not concentrate in the high-tech sector, as
they no longer hold this advantage.
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Appendix A
Change of k¯ω,p with respect to
change in saving s
In this section, I will show how does the limit on capital k¯ω,p change with saving
s. First, equation (3.11) which is used to determine kω,p can be re-written as:
k¯ω,p[r + (1− p)η]− pθlf(k¯ω,p) = [r + (1− p)η]s− (1− p)β
The first and second term on the left side are both increasing in kω,p; but given
the assumption that f() is concave, and the region of k we are interested is
where the marginal product capital is close to r, the left side has to be increas-
ing in k¯ω,p. The right side on the other hand, is clearly increasing in s. Thus,
the limits on capital kω,p is increasing in s
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1
The spread between expected profits of the credit rationing contract and the
non-credit rationing contract can be written as:
picr − pincr
= ηλ(phR− 1) + η(1− λ)w˜

(phR− 1)− IR&D − [2− (1− η)]w˜
−η(phR− 1)− (1− η)(1− λ)(plR− 1)− IR&D − [2− λ(1− η)]w˜
= (1− λ)[1− pˆR + (1− η)w˜ + η w˜

(phR− 1)] (B.1)
1. increasing in the spread of uncertainty ∆p while keeping pˆ constant;
Proof. I will prove this by separately proving that the spread between
expected profits of the credit rationing contract and the non-credit ra-
tioning contract is increasing: first, when increasing ph and lowering η
while keeping pˆ and pl constant; second, when lowering pl and increasing
η while holding pˆ and ph constant; third, when lowering pl and increasing
ph while holding pˆ and η constant. Any other way of increasing in the
spread of uncertainty ∆p is just a linear combination of the three.
(a) We can express ph in terms of η, pl and pˆ:
ph =
pˆ− (1− η)pl
η
(B.2)
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take this into (B.1) we have:
picr − pincr = (1− λ){1− pˆR + (1− η)w˜ + w˜

[(pˆ− pl)R− η(1− plR)]}
Now, we can see that the partial derivative ∂(pi
cr−pincr)
∂η
= −w˜−(1−plR)
is negative. Thus, when we increase ph, and lower η, while holding pl
and pˆ constant, picr − pincr increases .
(b) Given (B.1), we can see that the partial derivative ∂(pi
cr−pincr)
∂η
= (phR−
1) w˜

− w˜. Given that (phR−1) > 2w˜ and  < 2w˜, this partial derivative
is positive. Thus, when we increase η, and lower pl, while holding ph
and pˆ constant, picr − pincr increases .
(c) It is clear from (B.1) that picr − pincr is increasing in ph when holding
η and pˆ constant.
Thus, we can conclude that picr − pincr is increasing in the spread of uncer-
tainty ∆p while keeping pˆ constant.
2. decreasing(increasing) in λ when picr is higher(lower) than pincr.
Proof. It is easy to see this as picr − pincr = (1 − λ) × [1 − pˆR + (1 − η)w˜ +
η w˜

(phR−1)]. When the second term is positive, picr−pincr is decreasing in λ
as (1− λ) is decreasing in λ. Similarly, when the second term is negative,
picr − pincr is increasing in λ.
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Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 2
The spread between expected profits of the VC contract and the bank contract
can be written as:
piV C −max{pincr, picr}
= min{piV C − pincr, piV C − picr}
= min{(1− λ)(1− η)(1− plR + w˜)− (1− λ)c+ max{max{IR&D, w˜} − c, 0},
η(1− λ)(1− w˜

)(phR− 1)− (1− λ)c+ max{max{IR&D, w˜} − c, 0}}
Given that min{, } is a linear operator, all I need to do is separately prove that
piV C − pincr
= (1− λ)(1− η)(1− plR + w˜)− (1− λ)c+ max{max{IR&D, w˜} − c, 0}(C.1)
and
piV C − picr
= η(1− λ)(1− w˜

)(phR− 1)− (1− λ)c+ max{max{IR&D, w˜} − c, 0} (C.2)
are both
1. decreasing in λ;
2. increasing in the spread of uncertainty ∆p while keeping pˆ constant;
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3. increasing in IR&D;
4. increasing in .
Proof. 1. decreasing in λ:
Given (C.2) and (C.1), it is easy to see that both of these are decreasing in
λ. Because (1 − λ) is decreasing in λ, and that both (1 − η)(1 − plR + w˜)
and η(1− w˜

)(phR− 1) are positive.
2. increasing in the spread of uncertainty ∆p while keeping pˆ constant:
Once again I will use the same strategy as I used in (B) by separately
proving that both piV C − pincr and piV C − picr are increasing when: first,
when increasing ph and lower η while keeping pˆ and pl constant; second,
when lower pl and increasing η while holding pˆ and ph constant; and third,
when lower pl and increasing ph while holding pˆ and η constant.
(a) From (C.1), it is easy to see that piV C − pincr is decreasing in η when
pl and Pˆ is held constant, because (1− η) is decreasing in η and (1−
λ)(1− plR + w˜) is positive.
For piV C − picr, let’s take (B.2) into (C.2) then:
piV C−picr = (1−λ)(1−w˜

)(pˆR−plR−η(1−plR))−(1−λ)c+max{max{IR&D, w˜}−c, 0}
From the above equation we can see that the partial derivative ∂(pi
V C−picr)
∂η
=
−(1− plR) is negative, thus (C.2) is also decreasing in η when pl and
Pˆ is held constant.
(b) By replacing pl with pˆ−ηph1−η in (C.1), we have:
piV C−pincr = (1−λ)[1+w˜−pˆR+η(phR−1−w˜)]−(1−λ)c+max{max{IR&D, w˜}−c, 0}
The above term is increasing in η when pˆ and ph are both held con-
stant, because (1− λ)(phR− 1− w˜) is positive by assumption.
It is easy to see that piV C − picr is increasing in η when ph is held
constant.
(c) From (C.1), we can see that ∂(pi
V C−pincr)
∂pl
= −(1−λ)(1− η)R is negative,
thus piV C − pincr is decreasing in pl when η is held constant.
Also, from (C.2), we can see that ∂(pi
V C−picr)
∂pl
= η(1 − λ)(1 − w˜

)R is
positive, thus piV C−picr is increasing in in ph when eta is held constant.
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3. increasing in IR&D:
Both piV C−pincr and piV C−picr are increasing in IR&D, because max{max{IR&D, w˜}−
c, 0} is increasing in IR&D.
4. increasing in :
piV C − pincr is increasing in  since max{max{IR&D, w˜} − c, 0} is increasing
in .
On the other hand, because (1− w˜

) is increasing in  and η(1−λ)(phR− 1)
is positive, piV C − picr is also increasing in .
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